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CHAPTER 1: A BOLD VISION, DISAPPOINTING IMPLEMENTATION: 
WHY? 
1.1. INTRODUCTION 
In the 1970s the South African government identified skills shortage as a binding 
constraint for the ability of firms to adapt to new technology, industrialisation and 
globalisation. As a response it created the ‘manpower training system’ as a strategy 
to address the critical skills shortages. The manpower training system was designed 
to be in line with government’s apartheid policy. The outcome was a highly polarised 
and racialized national skills development system. The system created immense 
developmental challenges including huge socio-economic inequalities, and an 
unemployment and poverty problem that was defined along racial lines (McGrath, 
1996).  
 
The defeat of the apartheid government in the 1990s meant that the new 
democratically elected government desperately needed to address these socio-
economic challenges. It needed to do so while also trying to catch up with a rapidly 
globalising world economy characterised by rapid change, unprecedented 
competition, new technology, fast-growing emerging markets, workforce diversity, re-
engineering, and a demand for new skills. The draft of the 1997 Green Paper on 
Skills Development Strategy for Economic and Employment Growth in South Africa 
advocated for a bold vision for a state-driven national skills development system in 
partnership with firms, labour and a range of public and private training providers 
(Republic of South Africa, 1996: 62).  
 
The robust discussions following the announcement of the Green Paper led to the 
promulgation of a number of skills development legislations including the Skills 
Development Act (SDA) (No. 97 of 1998), which established Sector Education and 
Training Authorities (SETAs). The SDA envisaged SETAs to act as key agencies in 
the delivery of skills development and workplace experience seen as essential in 
addressing the triple challenges of inequality, unemployment, and poverty (Republic 
of South Africa, 1998). The SDA also envisioned that the SETAs will manage the 
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distribution of skills development grants to encourage firms to invest more in skills 
development. It was also imagined that SETAs will inspire learners to participate in 
training programmes and employers to use their workplaces as sites of learning and 
training in order to upgrade the skills of their employees and open up opportunities to 
new entrants eager to join the labour market to gain much-needed work experience 
(ibid). 
 
Despite this new bold vision, implementation has been a huge challenge. The 
SETAs have been relentlessly criticised in the media for failing to respond to the 
demand for medium and high skills in key sectors of the economy in an equitable 
and inclusive manner. SETAs perceived failure to perform its skills development 
function effectively is primarily attributed to a crisis in governance and administration, 
lack of Board professionalism, poor planning, and corruption (Marock, Harrison-
Train, Soobrayan & Gunthorpe, 2008; Barclay, 2012; Scott & Shuttleworth, 2007). 
The crisis in corporate governance manifest itself in poor service delivery, adverse 
media image, and the general pessimism around SETAs that continue to bedevil the 
implementation of the new national skills development system.  
 
SETA Boards tend to be riven with conflict as a result of their often opposing 
expectations and mandates, and the infighting spills over to executive managers and 
to the rest of the organisation. Barclay (2012) observed that the incompatible 
interests of stakeholders often dominate SETA Boards largely because of the 
inherent nature of their constituencies and concomitant mandates. Boards that are 
preoccupied with internal power struggles are wont to lose focus on their fiduciary 
duties which revolve around the implementation of the National Skills Development 
Strategy (NSDS) (now in its third phase of implementation). This causes a 
disjunction between the NSDS and firm-level training activity that, in turn, is one of 
the key challenges hindering the implementation of the national skills development 
system. SETA constitutions have been found to be too weak to govern stakeholder 
interests and give proper direction to the implementation of skills development (Scott 
& Shuttleworth, 2007).  
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Even though optimum value can be derived from having institutional arrangements 
that are geared to the implementation of projects supporting organisational strategy, 
one in three of all strategy implementations fail as there is often a major rift between 
strategy (as designed by principals) and the actual projects (as implemented by 
agents) (Buys & Stander, 2010). Agency theory hypothesised that managers are 
hired to look after the interests of shareholders, but managers sometimes act at the 
expense of shareholders (Hailemariam, 2001; Jensen, Murphy & Wruck, 2004). In 
the case of SETAs, government is the major shareholder but it is not always clear 
who are the beneficiaries of this initiative. Levy (2014) theorised that in a hierarchical 
long route of accountability where the public is linked to service delivery nodes via 
politicians and policymakers who are in turn linked to service delivery providers, it is 
crucial to align the goals of agents with that of their principals. The SETA 
arrangement is, nonetheless, unique in that Board members are appointed by the 
Minister of Higher Education and Training in their capacity of representing a 
particular constituency such as a union or a business association. This does not 
really fit the principal-agent relationship. And so, Levy argued, the stakeholders must 
work together to optimise joint benefits which will temper with their temptations to 
otherwise shirk, free ride or pursue selfish goals at the expense of the collective.  
 
This paper hypothesises that if the social partners comprising the SETA Boards have 
a collective initiative to support skills development, they will have strong incentives to 
adequately govern SETAs and not free ride or shirk their fiduciary duties thus 
ensuring alignment of SETA strategy with the NSDS and prevent individual(s) from 
capturing the public initiative for private purposes. Furthermore, the paper focuses 
on two key questions for sustainable workplace learning and training: Are SETAs 
failing to strengthen the partnership of the key stakeholders to ensure learners get 
an opportunity to obtain workplace learning? SETAs are failing to respond to the 
collective incentives of the social partners as a result of the breakdown of the agent-
principal linkages. The third and last hypothesis declares that SETA Boards fail to 
act on behalf of the interest of the social partners because of the breakdown of the 
agent-principal linkages. 
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The paper is organised in five sections. This first section is a short introduction to the 
study. It briefly discusses the vision of the SETAs, and, most significantly, also offers 
a theory of why the implementation of the national skills development system is 
floundering.  
 
Chapter 2 provides the context for the establishment of the SETAs. It traces the 
theoretical underpinnings for workplace-linked learning and training and the evolution 
of South Africa’s experience with, and institutional arrangements for, workplace-
linked training prior to the SETAs including the apartheid period. 
 
Chapter 3 provides a descriptive background of the SETAs including the process 
that led to their establishment in the year 2000. A descriptive overview of the 
evolving nature, architecture and performance over time of the SETAs is provided. 
The challenges of principal-agent governance will be analysed from a SETA 
perspective. 
 
In Chapter 4 the governance theory that provides the basis for the hypotheses is 
introduced. The challenges of principal-agent governance are explored from a SETA 
perspective. SETAs are unique in that members of the Board are nominated to serve 
in Boards because of their affiliations to unions and business organisations. Even so, 
the SDA demands that they exercise their autonomy and discretion in a multi-
stakeholder environment. 
 
A process analytical analysis is painstakingly done in Chapter 5 to assess the 
hypotheses made in Chapter 4.  
 
Chapter 6 concludes the report.  
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CHAPTER 2: SETTING THE STAGE 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
Even though, there is no single definition of workplace training, this study will use a 
definition that looks at all training that happens at the workplace and as a direct 
consequence of the needs of the workplace. In his seminal work Becker (1962) 
formalised the theory of human capital and provided an understanding on what 
drives the desire of employers and employees to invest in workplace learning.  In line 
with Becker’s propositions many governments use tax-based schemes to encourage 
firms to invest more in skills development. Even so, many countries are adopting the 
idea of creating a knowledge-based economy as a precondition to economic growth 
(Glastra, Hake & Schedler, 2004; Bencsik & Trunkos, 2009). The Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) has long identified workplace training 
as the key pillar towards establishing a knowledge-based economy (OECD, 1996). 
 
2.2. WORKPLACE TRAINING - DEFINED 
Human Resource Development, Lifelong Learning, Workplace Learning, On-The-Job 
Training are some of the concepts used to refer to workplace training. This study 
uses workplace training and workplace learning to refer to all training, learning, and 
skills formation that happen within the workplace. Likewise, two definitions of 
workplace training are instructive. First, Fuller and Unwin (2003: 7) viewed workplace 
training as an all embracing term for ‘all types of learning’ that come as a result of 
‘the needs of the workplace including formal on-the-job training, informal learning 
and work-related off-the-job education and training’. Second, Boud and Symes 
(2000: 14) described workplace training as a method of learning that happens on a 
routine on the factory floor as employees gain ‘new skills to develop new approaches 
to solving problems.’ The common theme in both explanations is that workplace 
training either takes place at the place of work or responds to the requirements of the 
job. 
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Boud (1998: 11) also warned that there is no common definition for workplace 
learning due to the often competing views, ideas, interests and values of the various 
players in the skills development environment including employees, employers, 
training providers, politicians and policy makers. Making reference to the elastic use 
of the concept of workplace training, McCormack (2000) noted that the 
conceptualisation of workplace learning depends on an allegiance to the different 
school of thoughts such as learning and development, human resource 
development, organisational development, learning organisations, and knowledge 
management. As an example, employees tend to view work from the perspective of 
its learning potential, which is fundamentally different to the perspective of employers 
who are wont to view work in terms of its contribution to production, effectiveness 
and innovation (Cullen, et al., 2002: 36). 
 
Be that as it may, workplace learning is often defined and promoted as beneficial to 
both employers and employees, on the one hand, and society and the state, on the 
other. In his study of the British post-school education and training system Forrester 
(1999: 189) observed that workplace training is promoted as a pillar of the 
‘modernising consensus’ leading to a successful and dynamic economy and also as 
a key contributor ‘towards addressing issues of social justice, equity and social 
inclusion.’ Here the first part of workplace learning is characterised, conceptualised 
and promoted in line with the human capital theory that hypothesises that the 
acquiring of knowledge and skills is linked to innovativeness, competitiveness and 
socioeconomic development. The second part takes a view synonymous with 
advocates of lifelong learning who believe that learning is an integral part towards 
the building of a socioeconomically inclusive knowledge-based economy. The 
human capital theory, knowledge economy and lifelong learning will be discussed in 
the next sub sections.  
 
2.3. HUMAN CAPITAL THEORY AND WORKPLACE TRAINING 
The classical, neo-classical and the post-modern endogenous growth models regard 
the increase in the quality of labour not only as a critical condition for the efficient use 
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of the other factor inputs in the production process but also as an essential indicator 
for economic growth (Kapustin, 1980: 132). 
Even though the concept of human capital is complex and many-sided it has always 
been understood to revolve around the acquisition of education, knowledge, talents 
and apprenticeship (Smith, 1776; Ricardo, 1951, Becker, 1964). Many theories had 
further postulated that investments in the education and training of the workforce will 
lead to an improvement in the quality and level of production (Schultz, 1961; Mankiw, 
2007), innovativeness (Aghion & Howitt, 1998), trade (Ricardo, 1951), savings 
culture (Todaro, 1994), competitiveness (Lai & Ng, 2014), and eventually economic 
growth (Kapustin, 1980). Examining the roles physical, human, and social capital 
play in China’s remarkable economic growth during the reform period of 1981–2010, 
Li and others (2015: 133) concluded that human capital is a major factor to China’s 
economic prosperity because it leads to ‘the improvement of labour productivity’. 
 
Becker (1964) formalised the theory of human capital to encompass all worker 
competencies and attributes acquired informally, non-formally and formally such as 
the health of the worker, migration, experiences, education and on-the-job training. 
Human capital, therefore, involves all investments made to all the factors that 
improve a person’s quality and level of production to allow the individual to 
participate meaningfully in the economy and society. In his survey of private sector 
training literature, Edwin Leuven (2005) found that the human capital theory, as 
formalised by Becker, has evolved to become the dominant viewpoint on workplace 
training.  
 
In his seminal work, Becker (1962) provided a central argument that rested on how 
the costs and returns on workplace training are shared by both the worker and the 
firm. Becker (1975) further expounded that workers and firms would finance 
workplace training when the discounted expected benefits is greater than the 
discounted expected costs. In the same vein, if the projected benefits are less than 
the discounted expected costs, employees and employers will underinvest in 
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training. Table 2.1 shows Becker’s propositions on what drives workplace training in 
the private sector. 
 
Table 2.1: Propositions for firms' and workers' incentives to pay for training 
Proposition  Benefit Pay cost Investment  
1. If training is general and labour markets are perfectly competitive Worker  Worker  Efficient  
2. If training is specific and the firm sets wages Firm  Firm  Efficient 
3. If training is specific, long-term contracting is possible (no 
renegotiation) and there are costs of evaluating and agreeing on 
the worker’s productivities in the firm and elsewhere 
Shared   Shared   Efficient 
Adapted from Becker (1962) 
 
Distinguishing between training that is general (training that is useful to all firms in 
the market) and one that is specific (training that is useful only to the training firm), 
Becker maintained that if workplace training is general and the labour markets are 
perfectly competitive, then firms will not invest in training because of the anxiety that 
skilled workers will be inclined to sell their labour to the highest bidder once they 
have been trained (Proposition 1). In this proposition there is nothing stopping non-
training firms to compete for the best skills available in the labour market regardless 
of which firm trained them. In this case, Becker argued, employees have higher 
incentives than employers to finance their own training as they will reap all the 
returns of their newly acquired capabilities. 
  
On the contrary, Becker (1962) believed that specific training would encourage firms 
to provide training as the new skills are not useful to other firms. This limits the 
discretion of the trained worker. In this scenario if the firm sets wages then its 
incentives to provide training becomes higher than those of the workers, as the firm 
will reap all the benefits of the training (Proposition 2). Furthermore, Becker believed 
that if the trained worker leaves the firm, then the investment in training is lost to both 
the firm and the worker. Whether the worker stays with the firm or not would depend 
on how the worker and the firm are prepared to share in the enhanced profits 
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factoring in the number of trained employees, turnover rates and ‘the cost of funds, 
attitudes toward risk, and desires for liquidity’ (Becker, 1962: 44). This scenario leads 
to Proposition 3 which introduced contracts to mitigate costly turnovers and lay-offs. 
Hashimoto (1981) postulated that firms and workers can avoid inefficient quitting and 
lay-offs through negotiating contracts that may include predetermined wages 
beforehand. For instance, the firm may pay the worker more to avoid turnover, and 
so having to train new entrants. A higher salary means both the employee and 
employer share in the newfound productivity of the employee. 
 
Becker (1962) concluded his theory by proposing that firms will provide general 
workplace training if the following conditions are true: 
(i) There is a strong probability that their employees will not be poached. 
(ii) The enhanced productivity of the employee is still not reflected in his 
market value. 
(iii) The employer makes a good profit if it trains its employees.  
As the skills market is not as perfect as Becker had suggested, and workplace 
training is invariably a sum of the general and specific training, poaching of workers 
is profitable for non-training firms. According to Stevens (1994: 541) ‘any source of 
imperfect competition leading to wages below marginal product, combined with any 
source of uncertainty about labour turnover, gives rise to this externality’ of poaching 
which, in turn, gives rise to underinvestment in workplace training. Leuven (2005: 
103) pinpointed the sources of imperfect competition including information 
asymmetries between the training firm and the market which may render the training 
provided to a worker invisible to the outside firms thus reducing the bargaining power 
of the worker to alternative employers. The true worth and abilities of the trained 
worker is thus known only by the incumbent firm thus preventing outside firms from 
providing better offers than the firm that had trained the worker. Katz and Ziderman 
(1990) called this phenomenon ‘worker liquidity constraint’. They further argued that 
certification of the training received mitigate worker liquidity constraint. Other sources 
of imperfect competition include the firm paying no more than a minimum wage 
(discouraging workers from investing in their own training) and collective bargaining 
(discouraging the firm from paying the most productive workers more).  
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There is plenty of empirical evidence dealing with the economic implications of the 
human capital theory. Using empirical models to examine the relationship between 
investment in human capital and corporate value, Yeh and Kung (2013) reported that 
both financial and non-financial indicators of human capital are associated with 
corporate value. Grossman (2000) also found that employee productivity is a 
composite indicator of the quality of human capital. Using Statistics Canada’s 
longitudinal and nationally representative data of the Workplace and Employee 
Survey Lai and Ng (2014) found that there is a strong symbiosis between 
competitiveness and workplace learning in Canada. 
 
Looking at the costs of and returns on general training, Loewenstein and Spletzer 
(1998) noted that the general training financed by incumbent employers has a lower 
effect on wages than past investment on general training by previous employers. 
This may suggest that existing knowledge and current skills has more net value to 
the worker than skills upgrade. Even so, in a monopsony an employer would be 
motivated to invest in general training as workplace training seems to not only attract 
skilful workers but also lead to lower salaries (Acemoglu & Pischke, 2000; Autor, 
2001). 
 
Boccanfuso, Savard and Savy (2009) sought to evaluate the influence human capital 
on economic growth using a sample of 22 African countries. Focusing on the 1970 to 
2000 period, they found that human capital contributes positively to the process of 
investment, saving, productivity, employment and economic growth.  
 
There is also a body of evidence supporting the link of an investment in high skills to 
firm productivity. Basing their study on the South African construction industry 
Kleynhans and Labuschagne (2012) learned that managers with higher skills levels 
accomplish higher levels of output. Kim (2015) reported similar findings with 
employees in the Eastern culture. Investing in workplace learning, Kim argued, does 
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not only improve the knowledge, skills and abilities of workers but also increases the 
performances of the firms and better satisfy the needs of clients. 
 
Rijsdijk and Rauch (2013: 935) applied the theory of human capital to 
entrepreneurship and recounted that the general human capital of business founders 
is positively linked to business progress after the first five years. Furthermore, they 
discovered that those owners with higher skills compensate for their human capital 
investment by growing their enterprises more than the owners with low skills and, 
thereby, reduce the risk of failure. There is also evidence that encouraging 
entrepreneurship has a positive relationship with human capital (Remeikienė & 
Startienė, 2013). 
 
Even though the rate of returns on investment in the quality of human capital differs 
from country to country, there is an overwhelming body of evidence confirming the 
link between the two variables. Table 2.2 charts some of the crucial studies on 
human capital and economic growth. 
 
Table 2.2: Rate of return on human capital investment 
Human capital Rate of return Source 
High school and College 13 % to 28 % Becker (1964)  
Additional schooling year 12 % to 16 %. Ashenfelter & Krueger (1994) 
Additional schooling year 10 % Rouse (1999) 
 
Using wages as a proxy for economic contribution, the high internal rate of returns 
from these studies suggest a strong link between human capital and economic 
prosperity.  
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Looking at the output per worker between rich countries and poor countries, Manuelli 
(2015) reported that the average years of schooling for the typical worker accounts 
for the high productivity of firms and wealth of the rich nations. ECLAC (2000) 
confirms that 12 years of schooling are necessary in order to have 90 % of 
possibilities of escaping poverty or not to fall in poverty. Even more encouraging is 
the finding that human capital reduces inequality thus contributing to the 
redistribution of the benefits of economic growth and reduction of poverty (Castelló-
Climent, 2010). 
 
2.4. WORKPLACE LEARNING AND THE KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 
Acknowledging the positive relationship between human capital, firm productivity and 
economic growth, many countries invest in lifelong learning as one of the 
fundamental building blocks to create a knowledge-based economy (Bencsik & 
Trunkos, 2009). New technology, high competition and rapid globalisation put 
pressure on both the public and private sectors to adapt to this new border-less 
markets. This is a market where knowledge economy where information is shared 
instantaneously without the constraints of time and space has become the gospel of 
the development agenda (Glastra, Hake & Schedler, 2004). The outcome is that the 
formation of new skills is seen as a way to adapt to this rapidly globalising market 
place (ibid). Former United Kingdom Secretary of State for Education and 
Employment David Blunkett (cited in Hann & Caputo, 2012: 5) is precise in his 
observation: 
 
‘In a knowledge-driven economy, the continuous updating of skills, attitudes 
and the development of lifelong learning will make the difference between 
success and failure, and between competitiveness and decline.’ 
 
Either through formal or non-formal training workers are engaged in skills 
development to gain new or upgrade their existing skills to enhance their contribution 
to productivity and competitiveness.  
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Promoting the narrative of a knowledge-based economy the OECD took the debate 
further and suggested that the new skills national economies need to adapt to 
technological change and new global competitions could only be delivered via the 
workplace because, firstly, most of the economically active population is at work and, 
secondly, several of these new skills can only be developed through work integrated 
learning (OECD, 1996).  
 
The European Council also promoted the knowledge economy and increased access 
to workplace training as a precondition for enhanced competitiveness, and in 
achieving its ‘Europe 2020’ objectives (European Council, 2007). Even so, there is 
evidence justifying the governments and policy makers that promote the idea of 
creating a knowledge-based economy as a response to high competition and new 
technological changes and new products and services as a result of a swiftly 
globalising world (Knoke & Kalleberg, 1994; Bartel & Lichtenberg, 1987; Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2002; Xu & Lin, 2010).  
 
Keep and James (2012) argued that the downside is that the idea of a knowledge 
based economy is based on the creation of a highly innovative super worker with 
high level skills at the expense of workers with low skills. The idea is that if you 
invest in human capital these new highly skilled ‘super workers’ will ensure the 
competitiveness of countries. But this supply-side model proved inappropriate in 
countries such as the United Kingdom (Green, et al., 2015) and South Africa as a 
result of lower demand for such knowledge workers (Kraak, 2014). 
 
Faced with challenges of scarcity of relevant skills governments of the world met in 
1993 in Vienna, and identified workplace training as a key pillar towards creating a 
knowledgeable and skilled workforce. No less than 171 countries adopted the 
Vienna Declaration urging countries to legislate for a programme to inculcate 
workplace learning in their respective countries. The national programme called 
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National Action Plan call to action states to ensure the skilling of a largely unskilled 
labour force in a manner that is equitable, fair, inclusive, and based on human rights 
ideals such as redress and access.  
 
Linked to the idea of creating a knowledge-based economy is lifelong learning that is 
defined by Edgar Faure (1972) as a concept acknowledging that learning is an 
unavoidable human activity from birth to old age, and that its delivery is vital for the 
realization of human potential and the spread of human rights and democratic ideals. 
Like human capital, lifelong learning encompasses all competencies and non-market 
activities acquired informally and formally. Most organisations require specific rather 
than general skills, which is best accomplished through workplace training 
(Acemoglu & Pischke, 1999). But unlike human capital, lifelong learning is grounded 
on the ideals of solidarity and human rights. Lifelong learning is thus intended to 
cater for all learners instead of just developing the competencies of those willing to 
use their skills and knowledge to improve productivity, competitiveness and 
economic growth.  Lifelong learning researchers such as Knapper and Cropley 
(2000) and Kirby, et al (2010: 294) described lifelong learning as learning how to 
learn, and lifelong learners as those able to set goals; apply appropriate knowledge 
and skills; engage in self-direction and self-evaluation; locate required information; 
and adapt their learning strategies to different conditions. Engaging in self-directed 
learning and setting goals is appropriate in responding to a rapidly-changing 
globalised economy (Fenwick 2013; Illeris, 2008). Illeris (2008) further expounded 
that there is an intimate relationship between what is to be learned, that is, the 
content dimension (skills, understandings, and abilities); the desire to learn, that is, 
the incentive dimension (emotions, feelings and volitions) as well as the support 
system, or social dimension of interaction, cooperation and communication.  
 
2.5. TRAIN OR PAY SCHEMES 
Recognising the need to build knowledge-based economies using a lifelong learning 
approach to skills development, many policy makers and governments accepted as 
true that firms shirk on workplace training (Dostie, 2015). This perspective is in line 
with Becker’s (1962) theoretical explanation that blames firms’ underinvestment on 
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workplace training mainly as a direct consequence of labour market failures. Many 
governments responded with policies that are designed to encourage firms to 
increase their investment in workplace learning regardless of the perceived labour 
market imperfections. According to Bassanini et al. (2007) these policy steps involve 
levy-grants, subsidies, co-finance, and other tax deductions systems. Purported to 
increase investment in training and giving government bodies leverage to decide on 
the type of training, the levy-grant system remains popular with many countries 
(Bassanini et al., 2007). Müller and Behringer (2012) listed 17 Central and Latin 
American and Caribbean countries, 17 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa, and 14 
from Europe among the more than 62 countries using levy-grant schemes.  
 
Dostie (2015) observed that when, in 2004, the Canadian government abolished its 
training levy scheme for medium sized firms, a government program that required 
firms with a payroll of over $250 000 to invest 1% of their revenue to training, these 
firms started substituting general training with specific, cheaper, non-certified 
training. Following broad discussion about the concept of lifelong learning in the 90s, 
the Dutch government introduced its triple tiered training levy system in 1998 
(Leuven & Osterbeek, 2004). The first tier is general and allows firms a deduction of 
20% on their profits for an expenditure on training. The second tier allows more 
deductions (4%) for smaller firms that spend on training. Designed to encourage 
firms to train older workers, the third tier allowed firms to make an extra 40% 
deduction on their profits for every trained worker that is 40 years an older. As a 
direct consequence of this tax laws Leuven and Osterbeek (2004) found that the 
training of workers 40 years or older was 15 - 20% higher than in the younger 
population. These experiences imply that pay-or-train schemes are effective in 
inducing the private sector to upgrade the skills of their workforce with the type of 
training government regard as scarce and required for economic prosperity.     
 
The British government introduced the levy-grant system during the 60s and 70s 
(Green, et al., 2015). The British training tax-based national training system involves 
state-owned, industrial training providers collecting levies from firms and managing 
the firms’ output on workplace training using the grant to induce firms to train more. 
According to Adams (2011: 12) Malaysia, Singapore, and Brazil also use levy-grant 
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schemes to inspire firms to invest more in workplace training. Lee (2004) noted that 
the Korean government employs the training levy-grant to stimulate corporate 
investment in workplace training. These major findings show that training levy-grant 
scheme might be one of viable institutional arrangements to deal with the problem of 
shortage of the skills and low investment in workplace training. 
 
2.6. THE EVOLUTION OF WORKPLACE TRAINING IN SOUTH AFRICA 
2.6.1. Master and Servants Act  
Both the Natal and Cape of Good Hope regions enacted legislations in the 1880s to 
train artisans to work mainly in the mines and railway infrastructure (Haywood, 
2004). In 1922, these laws, called Master and Servants Acts were replaced by the 
Apprenticeships Act. 
 
2.6.2. The Miners’ Strike of 1922 
Threatened by the introduction of black workers, white miners embarked on a strike 
in 1922 demanding protection from cheap black labour. The government of the day 
violently crushed the strike. The end of the strike resulted in the aptly named 
Industrial Conciliation Act of 1924. It was an Act that formalised the exclusion of 
black workers from the bargaining council agreements (Haywood, 2004). A decade 
and half later the powers that be established the Central Organisation of Central 
Training to train artisans for the Second World War.  
 
2.6.3. Black Housing Shortage 
The critical shortage for housing of black workers working in the gold and diamond 
mines necessitated the building of ghettos and the passing of the Black Building 
Workers Act of 1951. The National Party had just come to power, in 1948, following 
a campaign that promised to establish apartheid. This law was one of the signals the 
apartheid government wanted to use to show its voters it meant business. The Black 
Building Act did not only provide for the regulation of black builders but also for the 
regulation of workplace training for the black builders. But the devil was in the detail. 
The regulations demanded that black builders must not be certificated for the training 
they receive to ensure they continue to be regarded as unskilled and deserving of 
their poor wages.  
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2.6.4. The Botha Commission 
Following the victory of the Nationalist Party with the promulgation of the Black 
Building Workers Act of 1951, apartheid became a policy of government in education 
and training. Mandated to combat white poverty, the Botha Commission reviewed 
the existing industrial legislation. The outcome was the new Industrial Reconciliation 
Act of 1956 that effectively excluded black workers from participating in trade union 
activities. It also reserved jobs for whites. In the 70s the law was amended to give 
powers to the Industrial Council to begin charging employers a compulsory levy 
(Haywood, 2004).  
 
2.6.5. The Manpower Act  
In the wake of the 16 June 1976 Soweto Riots that soon spread to other urban 
areas, the apartheid government appointed the Wiehahn Commission to investigate 
South Africa's labour legislation, and the Riekert Commission to explore manpower 
utilisation and influx control measures (Wiseman, 1986: 168). The recommendations 
of the Riekert and Wiehahn Commissions led to the promulgation of The Manpower 
Act (No. 56 of 1981) creating the Manpower Development Fund to capitalise training 
centres. The legislation also led to the establishment of the National Training Board 
(NTB), and an incentive scheme for training providers. Even though the Manpower 
Act removed all references to race, it continued the systemic exclusions of blacks, in 
general, and black workers, in particular. The Manpower Act was amended in 1988 
to clarify the powers of the NTB and establish Industry Training Boards to effectively 
take over the training of artisans in the workplace.  
 
2.7. THE IMPACT OF THE APARTHEID LAWS 
Looking at the impact that the laws enacted before and during the apartheid years 
had on society does not provide pleasant reading. McGrath (1996), Gamble (2004) 
and later Allais (2012) agreed that the result of these laws (from the 1880s to the 
Manpower Act of 1981) was low skills production, employer voluntarism, exclusive 
artisan training for white men through state-owned enterprises, and a highly unequal 
public education system.  
 
The way the apartheid government had been regulating training including workplace 
learning left South Africa with an elitist, segregated and unequal society where black 
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and coloured people are disproportionately unemployed and redundant as compared 
to their white counterparts.  Employers voluntarily contributed a skills levy to 
industrial Boards. But the National Training Strategy Initiative (NTSI) suggested that 
this voluntary enterprise training was selective with workers and discriminated 
against small and medium-sized enterprises, black workers and especially those with 
lower levels of formal education. It is a system that begged to be replaced. Adams 
(2007: 11) remembered the conditions very well: 
 
‘On grounds of equity, if not efficiency, these conditions of employment 
provide a rationale for public interventions to broaden access and investment 
in education and skills for those left behind by enterprise-based training. 
These interventions may include public provision, but also public financing of 
private providers, including training by enterprises.’ 
 
For many like Adams these egregious conditions needed a new agenda to address 
the changing nature of demand for high level skills in a manner that promotes equity, 
access and inclusivity. 
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CHAPTER 3: ENTER THE SETAS 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The story of SETAs begins during the twilight years of apartheid. Following the 
unbanning of political parties on 2 February 1990 the political adversaries had no 
choice but to sit around the table and negotiate a future South Africa. These talks 
included discussions on forging a future national skills development based on human 
rights and democratic ideals. The most important of these talks was the national 
training strategy task team that was formed by the NTB.  
 
3.2. THE NATIONAL TRAINING STRATEGY INITIATIVE  
From 1991 to 1993, at the time when South Africa was engrossed with negotiating 
the end of apartheid, the NTB formed a task team to design a new national training 
strategy. Noting the unbanning of political parties and the other signals of the 
imminent demise of apartheid, the NTB started working closely with the African 
National Congress and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (Cosatu). Bobby 
Godsell (cited in the Singizi Report, 2007: 50) acknowledged that as early as 1992 a 
section of the business community accepted the advantages of talking with Cosatu 
on a future skills development regime. 
 
The task team concluded its mission in 1994 with the National Training Strategy 
Initiative (NTSI), a report that set in motion processes to establish the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA) and the National Qualifications Framework (NQF) as 
well as the SDA. The NTSI advocated for the integration of the racialized education 
and training system, and for a single national qualifications framework that allows 
portability and articulation of learning programmes as well as training that is in line 
with the demands of the industry.  
 
3.3. SAQA AND THE NQF 
To change this established apartheid system, the new democratic government 
promulgated laws such as the SAQA Act (Republic of South Africa, 1995) replaced 
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in 1998 with the NQF Act (Republic of South Africa, 1998). In line with some of the 
NTSI recommendations the NQF Act seeks to, among others, redress the 
imbalances of the past in the education and training system; facilitate mobility of 
learners through articulation of qualifications; and contribute towards the economic 
advancement of individuals and the state. 
 
 
3.4. THE GREEN PAPER ON SKILLS DEVELOPMENT 
Faced with the unequal skills development system, the new democratic government 
announced in March 1997 the Green Paper on a Skills Development Strategy for 
Economic and Employment Growth in South Africa as ‘a new skills revolution’ to 
replace the racialised education and training system with an equitable and inclusive 
national training system (Republic of South Africa, 1997). From the NTSI to the 
formulation (and reformulation) of the Green Paper on Skills Development, organised 
labour, business, educationalists and other stakeholders had been engaged on talks 
trying to find a solution towards a single vision of a national skills development 
system. Even though the negotiating teams accepted the merits of their often 
competing interests they almost always managed to retain the legacy of what 
ostensibly are their competing imperatives and expectations. The Green Paper was 
therefore a set of compromises between labour and business, the two protagonists 
in the processes leading to the current national skills development system.  
 
Believing that the existing elitist and voluntary nature of skills development was not 
only discriminatory but also encouraged firms to shirk their responsibility to train 
workers, labour unions took a view that the new skills development should be 
favourable to workers. During negotiations labour defined ‘skills’ as a necessary 
‘project of employee development’ (Republic of South Africa, 1997). This reflected 
the tensions and lack of mutual trust between labour and business. 
 
Business wanted to hang on to the ‘voluntarism’ nature of workplace training that 
had characterised skills development during apartheid rule. Business Unity South 
Africa (Busa), an umbrella body for business, declared that they were ‘instinctively 
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uncomfortable’ with the Green Paper because of its proposals to force employers to 
invest more in training (Haywood, 2004). Busa argued that the proposed levy of 1 - 
1.5% of firm’s salary bill was exorbitant and will lead to unintended consequences 
such as an increase in business costs and job cuts. Cosatu, on the other hand, 
demanded that the proposed levy was too little and must be increased to 4%. Cosatu 
also used the platform to bargain for minimum wages and a 40-hour week. If 
business does not want to adequately invest in workplace training, Cosatu argued, 
then they need to pay workers very well and allow them time off so workers can 
invest their own money and time to their own development. The parties could not 
agree, and government had to intervene.  
 
Both parties, however, agreed that all stakeholders should be enabled to participate 
meaningfully and equally in the national skills development strategy and the 
proposed SETAs. Involving more than 150 representatives from government, labour 
and business, the agreement covered up the competing interests of the key 
protagonists. Using the NQF as a site of contestation Cosatu saw the mooted SDA 
as a mechanism for their members to not only gain marketable skills but recognition 
and promotion linked to a skills-based grading system. On the contrary, firms saw 
the proposed national skills development system as a panacea for competitiveness 
and multi-skilled workers doing complex multi-tasks while on the same grade. The 
divergent views and expectations led to a NSDS with over 20 objectives. This 
rigmarole wish-list of all stakeholders may be blamed for the Board conflicts that 
beset SETAs and a wide mandate susceptible to scope creep (Marock, 2010). 
 
The government promoted the view that the proposed levy-grant system will induce 
non-training firms and those training at a low level to train because they will recover 
their contributions to the skills fund. Government saw the proposed sectoral 
agencies as a mechanism to give the public sector more control on the skills 
development system. Kraak (2004: 125) asserted that through the levy-grant scheme 
government has a model that ‘cedes real leverage to the state over the market’. For 
Adams (2007: 11) government also saw in the future skills development system a 
mechanism to provide interventions to broaden access to skills development 
activities for those often left behind by workplace-based training.  
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Even so, organised labour also won some major victories in the processes leading to 
the skills development bill. Cosatu and its then major affiliate NUMSA, believing in a 
lifelong learning approach to workplace training, fought for the Recognition of Prior 
Learning (RPL), paid study and training leave, and certification as a link to personal 
career advancement (Badroodien & McGrath, 2005). They scored some victories 
with these demands. The RPL and certification of all learning are built into the NQF. 
And the study and training leave is embedded into the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act.  
 
3.5. THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT BILL 
Even though the Skills Development Bill rejected Cosatu’s suggestion of a 4% levy 
and a 40-hour week, it received support from all the major political parties 
represented in parliament (Haywood, 2004). Bemoaning the low levels of investment 
on workplace training by South African firms, Mayimele, an African National 
Congress (ANC) Member of Parliament, believed that passing of the Bill would 
increase private sector investment in training. Mayimele’s view were in line with 
observations made at the time. South African firms invested no more than 1.5% of 
payroll on training as compared to over 5% and 8% that European and Japanese 
firms invested in workplace learning respectively (Sethi, 1993). Fourie, representing 
the National Party (the official opposition) joined the other smaller parties to express 
his full support for the Bill: ‘This bill is fortunately not one of those bills that render the 
labour market more rigid and which will have a major impact on the labour market’ 
(SA Parliamentary Hansard, 2008).   
 
3.6. THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT ACT 
Following the discussions on the Green Paper as well as the parliamentary 
deliberations and passing of the bill, the new democratic government promulgated 
the SDA (No 98 of 1998) in order to transform the established apartheid training 
system and do away with the ‘voluntarism’ and the unequal nature of the skills 
development system (Republic of South Africa, 1998). The NTSI had suggested the 
replacement of the racialised National Training Board and Industrial Boards with 
more representative Boards called Sector Education and Training Organisations. 
The SDA requires the establishment of SETAs to be equally representative of 
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organised labour and business associations operating within a sector. It also 
prescribed a NSDS to be reviewed every five years to bring about a tripartite 
partnership of state, employers and labour to work with a range of public and private 
training providers to broaden access to workplace training to both existing workers 
and new entrants to the labour market.  
 
Section 2 (1) of the SDA outlined the purpose of the Act as:  
 
a) to develop the skills of the South African workforce -  
(i) to improve the quality of life of workers, their prospects of work and labour  
mobility;  
(ii) to improve productivity in the workplace and the competitiveness of 
employers;  
(iii) to promote self-employment; and  
(iv) to improve the delivery of social services;  
b) to increase the levels of investment in education and training in the labour market 
and to improve the return on that investment;  
c) to encourage employers -  
(i) to use the workplace as an active learning environment;  
(ii) to provide employees with the opportunities to acquire new skills;  
(iii) to provide opportunities for new entrants to the labour market to gain work  
experience; and  
(iv) to employ persons who find it difficult to be employed;  
d) to encourage workers to participate in learning programmes;  
e) to improve the employment prospects of persons previously disadvantaged by 
unfair discrimination and to redress those disadvantages through training and 
education; 
f) to ensure the quality of learning in and for the workplace;  
g) to assist -  
(i) work-seekers to find work;  
(ii) retrenched workers to re-enter the labour market;  
(iii) employers to find qualified employees; and  
h) to provide and regulate employment services. 
(Republic of South Africa, 1998) 
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As South Africa’s inability to realise higher economic growth and lower 
unemployment rate have been blamed on the shortage of skilled workers and an 
oversupply of unskilled workers (Republic of South Africa, 2006; Republic of South 
Africa, 2011), the new policy landscape provided government with a well-funded and 
inclusive system to move the economy away from its skills shortage trap (Allais, 
2012).  
 
3.7. THE SKILLS DEVELOPMENT LEVIES ACT  
The SDA provided for the financing of skills development and prescribed a levy-
financing scheme and a National Skills Fund setting in motion the promulgation of 
the Skills Development Levies Act (SDLA). The SDLA gave impetus to the new levy-
grant training system. Levies are collected to create a fund to be allocated back to 
firms as mandatory grants1 to refund employers training expenses. The 
implementation of the new policy framework required all employers with an annual 
payroll of R500 000 or more to pay a skills levy equal to 1% of their annual payroll 
(Republic of South Africa, 1999). In turn the employer receives a grant equal to 50% 
of the skills levy paid. In order to qualify for this mandatory grant, however, the 
employer had to complete a Workplace Skills Plan (WSP) and provide an Annual 
Training Report (ATR). In the beginning of the year the employer submits a WSP 
indicative of the intended training for the upcoming financial year. At the end of the 
financial year the firms submit the ATR showing all training provided to staff during 
the reporting period. This then qualifies the firm to reimbursement of their portion of 
the training funds.  
 
Part of the collected levies goes to the South African Revenue Service for 
administration and the National Skills Fund for allocation to SETAs who in turn 
disburse the money to companies that train. The remainder flows back to the 
relevant sector in proportion to sector contributions as discretionary funds to address 
scarce and critical skills identified by the relevant SETA (Republic of South Africa, 
                                                          
1
 Mandatory Grants means funds designated as mandatory grants to fund the education and 
training programmes as contained in the Workplace Skills Plan (WSP) and Annual Training 
Report (ATR) of a company (Merseta, 2014). 
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1998). The proper usage of discretionary grants2 is key in ensuring South Africa has 
the required skills to compete successfully in international markets.  
 
Using agencies to administer a levy-grant scheme where government collects taxes 
and disburses funds to firms to implement approved training programs is a common 
financing tool used by countries such as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brazil to inspire 
firms to not only train but also purchase ‘training services competitively on the open 
market from public and private providers for target groups’ (Adams, 2011: 12). 
Despite an improvement in productivity Vally and Motala (2014) are of the view that 
employers also benefit from the levy-grant system due to the accumulation of cheap 
but skilled labour. By skilling new entrants into the labour market the SDA policy 
environment expands the pool of skilled but unemployed people for firms to choose 
from and thus, all things equal, putting downward pressure on wages. 
 
3.8. ENTER THE SETAS 
In providing for an institutional framework to devise and implement national, sector 
and workplace strategies to develop and improve the skills of the South African 
workforce, the SDA and SDLA provided the bricks and mortar for the formation of 
SETAs. Labour Minister Membathisi Mdladlana announced the formation of 25 
SETAs in 2000. Replacing the 33 Industry Boards associated with the racialised 
manpower training scheme, each of the 25 SETAs had its own sector to organise 
and develop a sector skills plan.   
 
Unlike the industrial training Boards it was replacing, the SETAs were given much 
more responsibility including the promotion and registration of the new learnerships. 
Section 10 (1) of the SDA provided the enormous scope and functions of SETAs:  
‘(a) develop a sector skills plan within the framework of the national skills 
development strategy;  
                                                          
2
 Discretionary Grants are grants paid to Merseta member companies and other legal enterprises, at the 
discretion of the Merseta Accounting Authority, to encourage stakeholders to contribute towards the 
achievement and objectives of the NSDS (Merseta, 2014). 
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(b) implement its sector skills plan by-  
(i) establishing learning programmes;  
(ii) approving workplace skills plans and annual training reports;  
(iii) allocating grants in the prescribed manner and in accordance with any 
prescribed standards and criteria to employers, education and skills 
development providers and workers; and  
(iv) monitoring education and skills development provision in the sector;  
     (c) promote learning programmes by-  
(i) identifying workplaces for practical work experience;  
(ii) supporting the development of learning materials;  
(iii) improving the facilitation of learning; and  
(iv) assisting in the conclusion of agreements for learning programmes, to the 
extent that it is required;  
(d) register agreements for learning programmes, to the extent that it is required;  
(e) perform any functions delegated to it by the QCTO in terms of section 26I;  
(f) when required to do so as contemplated in section 7(1) of the Skills Development  
Levies Act, collect the skills development levies, and must disburse the levies,  
allocated to it in terms of sections 8(3)(b) and 9(b), in its sector;  
(g) liaise with the National Skills Authority on-  
(i) the national skills development policy;  
(ii) the national skills development strategy; and  
(iii) its sector skills plan;  
(h) submit to the Director-General-  
(i) any budgets, reports and financial statements on its income and 
expenditure that it is required to prepare in terms of the Public Finance 
Management Act; and  
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(ii) strategic plans and reports on the implementation of its service level 
agreement;  
(i) liaise with the provincial offices and labour centres of the Department and any 
education body established under any law regulating education in the Republic to 
improve information-  
(i) about placement opportunities; and  
(ii) between education and skills development providers and the labour 
market;  
(iA) liaise with the skills development forums established in each province in such 
manner and on such issues as may be prescribed;  
(j) subject to section 14, appoint staff necessary for the performance of its functions;  
(jA) promote the national standard established in terms of section 30B; 
(jB) liaise with the QCTO regarding occupational qualifications; and  
(k) perform any other duties imposed by this Act or the Skills Development Levies 
Act or consistent with the purposes of this Act.’ 
(Republic of South Africa, 1998: 21). 
 
Despite this bold vision and the diversity of objectives set out in the SDA, the SETAs 
mandate is reviewed every five years through the NSDS that set up specific targets. 
The SETA mandate is also unclear on who is its primary beneficiary. It talks of 
workplace training (for the employed), placement opportunities (for job seekers), 
identifying workplaces for practical work experience (for pre-graduates and the 
unemployed), allocating grants (employers), and facilitating learning (ostensibly for 
learners). The SDA is setting up the SETA to be a darling to every suitor, and is 
often accused of its wide scope that allows scope creep (Singizi Report, 2007; 
Marock, 2010).  
 
It is clear with the broad SETA mandate that the policy makers were looking beyond 
just increasing investment in workplace training. Partly to resolve the skills shortage 
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trap and partly to solve the unemployment problem, government also wanted to use 
the SETAs to ensure a well-funded training system inclusive of the often left behind 
unemployed youth and new entrants to the labour market. The downside with this 
solution is that it was based on the assumption of generous firms willing to play a 
positive role in solving South Africa’s broader training challenges as well as the 
questions of unemployment, poverty and inequality – again an assumption that is not 
consistent with the underlying logic of a SETA style model. Using Becker’s (1962) 
theory of human capital government’s assumptions militated against the firms’ 
incentive to provide specific rather than general training. 
 
3.8.1. The National Skills Development Strategy  
The NSDS, now in its third phase of implementation, is a framework that provides 
direction and focus areas for a five-year period on initiatives such as learnerships, 
apprenticeships, internships, adult learning programmes and other workplace 
integrated learning innovations. Providing targets to the SETAs the NSDS is a 
mechanism to not only create a conducive environment for skills development to 
thrive but also to focus its trajectory ensuring that SETA activities respond to the 
demands of their respective sectors. These regimes of workplace training and skills 
development are crucial in expanding the base of scarce and critical skills such as 
artisans and technicians. The synergy between the NSDS and SETA activity will 
provide employers with more choice of the skilled labour they require for innovation, 
competitiveness and productivity. In the same vein government is able to adequately 
respond to the skills needs of the country and increase the employability of the 
economically active populations. For government to be able to fine tune the NSDS, 
there is an increasing need to know whether SETA, and by extension firms, activities 
are adequately aligned with the strategy. 
 
3.8.2. SETA Board Composition 
Like the NSDS, the Board of a SETA is renewed every five years. The SDA 
prescribes that the Board must be composed of an equal number of organised 
workers and organised business representatives. It also requires the appointment of 
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no more than three people representing relevant government departments. The Act 
also allows the Minister of Higher Education and Training3 to appoint relevant 
bargaining councils and professional bodies after consultation with the labour, 
employers and the relevant departments represented in the Board. On paper, the 
Minister receives nominations from the relevant sectors, and appoints Board 
members based on the nominations. In practice the employer and employee 
constituencies forming a SETA nominate candidates to take up positions in the 
SETA boards. In line with Section 13 of the SDA, the constitution of a SETA 
specifies the ‘trade unions, employer organisations and relevant government 
departments in the sector’. The Minister then appoints Board members using the 
candidates he or she had been given by the unions and employer associations. This 
arrangement comes with its own challenges.  
 
Board members are appointed by the Minister in their individual capacities ostensibly 
because of their skills, experience and knowledge. In practice they are nominated bu 
business and labour, as representatives of business and organised labour, to 
represent their interests. Section 11 of the SDA requires the Minister to appoint only 
people representing organised labour and organised business in equal measure and 
representatives of relevant government departments. This then put the onus to 
nominate potential Board members on organised business and organised labour, 
and the SETA Boards reflect this constituencies. For instance, the Wholesale and 
Retails SETA was comprised of 12 members equally represented by organised 
labour and business associations; Bank SETA Board has six people representing 
labour and another six  representing business; and FASSETT has 17 members split 
equally between labour (eight)  and business (eight) with the other member being the 
CEO. BANK SETA and W&R SETA also had a government representative 
representing the Department of Trade and Industry. Barclays (2012) concluded that 
once constituencies nominate their representatives they are automatically appointed. 
Barclays also reported that despite SETAs requiring government participation there 
is either limited (one or two) or none at all.    
 
                                                          
3
 Previously the SETAs reported to the Minister of Labour. 
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Given the equal representations of labour and business on SETA Boards to what 
extent is the discretion of individual Board members seriously taking their fiduciary 
duties as compared to their ‘constituency-facing’ mandate. Some Board members 
may choose to pander to the Minister’s wishes (as the appointing principal), despite 
representing their constituencies as contemplated in the SDA, to secure their 
membership to the Board. Others may single-mindedly pursue the interests of their 
constituencies at the expense of the objectives of the SDA and good corporate 
governance. The risks of the SETAs being loci of patronage politics linked to the 
interests of the appointing Minister or nominating constituencies is very high. The 
logic of multi-constituency SETA governance depends for its success on the 
business and labour constituencies taking their collective responsibilities seriously. 
Barclay (2012) reported that SETA Board members had disparate views and 
interests that often lead to conflict and paralysis.  
 
3.8.3. The Changing Nature of SETAs 
Ever since the inception of the SDA, the SETA landscape has been changing – 
thanks to mergers. From the initial 25 at the beginning of 2000, there are now 21 
SETAs.  Table 3.1 demonstrate the patterns and nature of changes during the three 
NSDS periods.  
 
Table 3.1: The Changing Nature of SETAs per Sector 
No. 1 April 2000 1 July 2005 1 April 2012 
1 PAETA (Primary agriculture) AGRISETA (Agriculture) AGRISETA 
2 SETASA (Secondary agriculture) 
4 BANKSETA (Banking) BANKSETA BANKSETA 
5 CETA (Construction) CETA CETA 
 FIETA (Forest) FIETA FP&M SETA (Fibre 
Processing & 
Manufacturing) 6 CTFL (Clothing, Textiles, Footwear & Leather)  CTFL 
7 CHIETA (Chemical Industries) CHIETA CHIETA 
8 PSETA (Public Service) PSETA PSETA 
 ESETA (Energy) ESETA EWSETA (Energy & 
Water) 
9 ETDP SETA (Education, Training, Development) ETDP SETA ETDP SETA 
10 FASSET FASSET FASSET 
11 FOODBEV (Food & Beverages) FOODBEV  FOODBEV  
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12 HWSETA (Health & Welfare) HWSETA HWSETA 
14 INSETA (Insurance) INSETA  INSETA  
15 MQA (Mining) MQA  MQA  
16 SERVICES SETA (Services) SERVICES SETA  SERVICES SETA  
17 TETA (Transport) TETA  TETA  
18 WRSETA (Wholesale & Retail) WRSETA WRSETA 
19 LGSETA (Local Government) LG SETA LG SETA 
20 MAPPP (Media, advertising, Publishing, Printing & 
Packaging) 
MAPPP MICT SETA (Media, 
Information & 
Communication 
Technologies) 21 ISETT (Information Technology) ISETT 
22 MERSETA (Manufacturing & Engineering) MERSETA MERSETA 
23 THETA THETA CATHSETA (Culture, 
Art, Tourism, & 
Hospitality)  
24 POSLEC (Police, Private Security, Legal & 
Correctional Services) 
SASSETA (Safety & 
Security) 
SASSETA 
25 DIDTETA (Diplomacy, Intelligence, Defence & Trade) 
 
Most of the SETAs were merged to provide more efficiency and streamline the 
system. The SETAs responsible for Police, Private Security, Legal, and Correctional 
Services (POSLEC) and Diplomacy, Intelligence, Defence and Trade (DIDTETA) 
had a lot in common and were reorganised into the SASSETA with a focus on Safety 
and Security education and training. The same is true with primary and secondary 
agriculture SETAs who also merged to form the Agriculture SETA to make the 
industry SETA more efficient.  
 
3.9. SETA PERFORMANCE OVER TIME 
3.9.1. Background to SETA performance 
As an intermediary between government, labour, business and education and 
training providers, SETAs have been established to encourage, among others, the 
many skills development needs in the workplace. The levy-grant training system 
began in 2000 with the launch of SETAs and the NSDS I. The SDA introduced, 
among others, new concepts such as learnerships and skills programmes as a 
counterweight to the racialised apprenticeship system. Phase II of the NSDS began 
in 2005 and ended in March 2011 paving a way for Phase III which started in April 
2011 and is expected to come to an end in 2018 following a two-year extension at 
the end of 2015. De-racialising the artisanal, technical and occupational 
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qualifications is being pushed to the top of the skills development agenda. Even so, 
responding to the skills shortages means increasing the number of people in training, 
and the number of people gaining much-needed workplace-based qualifications.  
 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the role of SETAs in skills development. Ever since the 
inception of the SETAs over 250 000 learners have achieved qualifications through 
the system by 2012. An average of 12 254 learners per year enrolled with SETAs 
during NSDS I and II (prior 2010) as compared to an average of 46 701 of the first 
three years of NSDS III.  
 
Figure 3.1: Learners’ enrolments and achievements registered on the NLRD 
 
Source: National Learners’ Records Database (own calculation) 
 
A significant number of learners are achieving qualifications in the NSDS III phase as 
compared to the previous two phases of the strategy. Now that there is a mandatory 
grant for employers to claim back from the SETAs, there are emerging concerns that 
these numbers may reflect a ‘repackaging of  training  that  employers 
would  carry  out  regardless  of  the  levy-grant  system’ rather than a 
skills revolution (Marock, 2010: 14).  
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Regardless of the purported focus on workplace training, pre-graduates of 
Universities of Technology and Technical Vocational and Education and Training 
(TVET) colleges are struggling to obtain workplace placements, and get a full 
qualification (Allais & Nathan, 2012). This is so even when organized business and 
employers are vocal about being part of a skills development dispensation that, in 
theory, encourages apprenticeships and work placements. 
 
3.9.2. NSDS I: 2000 to 2005 
3.9.2.1. The Mandate 
Following the promulgation of the SDA (No. 97 of 1998) and the subsequent 
establishment of Merseta, the first phase of the NSDS was implemented from 2000 
to 2005. Titled ‘Skills for Productive Citizenship for All’ the NSDS I sought to 
establish a partnership of both the public and private sectors and the workers that 
will instil a demand-driven, lifelong learning approach to workplace learning in order 
to promote productivity and contribute to economic growth. 
 
During this phase, the mandate of the SETAs revolved around: 
 Developing and implementing WSPs to achieve the goals and objectives of the 
NSDS; 
 Developing the first SSP describing the employment as well as the growth and 
skills trends in order to identify the priorities for skills development in the sector; 
 Achieving the SSP, which involves assisting and encouraging employers and 
workplaces to prepare the workplace, and administering learnerships, which 
include and extend the traditional apprenticeships of the past; 
 Implementing the NQF by supporting the standards-generating processes, and 
by giving employers, workers and providers advice on how to implement the 
NQF; 
 Assuring quality by accrediting education and training providers, monitoring 
provision, registering training assessors, collaborating with other education and 
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training quality assurers (ETQAs) and reporting to the South African 
Qualifications Authority (SAQA); and 
 Administering the levy grant system that makes provision for mandatory and 
discretionary grants.  
Funded on the basis of payroll levies this new partnership training dispensation was 
innovative and sophisticated but it was also beset by many challenges related to the 
fact that SETAs were still new. Some of these teething problems have been caused 
by delays in putting the appropriate infrastructure into place. Others have been 
caused by difficulties in aligning the training system to the qualifications system. 
From the outset these problems, coupled with the obligation to adhere to the 
requirements of the NQF, which was also new, in order to start the training process 
have hopelessly compromised the planned outputs of the system.  
 
3.9.2.2. Two Centres of Power 
SETAs were accountable to two competing ministries making government strategy to 
become uncoordinated and unresponsive. This disconnect was illustrated through 
parallels evident between the Department of Labour and the Department of Education 
in their respective policy responses to the NSDS (Bird & Heitmann, 2009: 8). 
Furthermore, Bird and Heitmann (2009: 10) proffered that the cleavage between these 
two centres of skills development power ‘reflects the past failures of the South African 
government to learn lessons from those who, whilst facing similar tensions between 
demand and supply, had evolved systems and strategies to straddle these two 
domains’. The governance challenges related to the ‘two centres of training power’ 
began at the inception of SETAs and continued well into the NSDS II.  
 
3.9.2.3. SETA Inefficiency  
By the end of 2004, only 14% out of the 70 000 registered SETA learners had 
finished their learning programmes (Mahlong, 2009) . Using the five key focus areas 
of SETAs Marock and others (2008) blamed the poor performance of SETAs on 
inefficiency and poor planning. The lack of efficiency, Marock et al. argued, is as a 
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result of SETAs not understanding their mandate and scope creep. Like 
learnerships, the registrations and completions of skills programmes was very poor 
compared to the billions of Rands being ploughed into the SETA system. Defined as 
an accredited learning programme that is occupationally based and which, when 
completed, may constitute credits towards a qualification registered on the NQF 
(Republic of South Africa, 2008a), skills programmes provide SETAs with an 
opportunity to target specific skills needs that are peculiar to the sector such as 
retrenchment assistance plans and literacy and mathematics programmes.  
 
According to Numsa the bulk of workers in the manufacturing, construction and 
engineering sectors have qualifications below NQF level 2, and so could not access 
skills programmes that require high level qualifications4. For the unions Adult 
Education and Training (AET) was a critical intervention but the unions found it hard 
to convince employers of the importance of upgrading the educational level of their 
unskilled staff because according to Mummenthey and others (2012) employers tend 
to misunderstand the concept of AET. Employers see AET as a ruse to get labour to 
demand more wages once the staff become more educated (ibid).  As a result they 
have not used it effectively to upgrade the lower echelons of the occupational ladder. 
In turn this constipates the pool of workers eligible to register for the much-needed 
artisanships and mid-level skills programmes. 
 
3.9.2.4. Huge Spending on Short Courses 
Another disjunction between firm-activity and the SETAs is seen in the huge 
spending on short courses by firms, and subsequent claiming. The NSDS advocates 
for spending on vocational training that leads to a qualification or part-qualification. 
This disjunction may be as a result of a number of possibilities including: 
 Firms’ reluctance to break away from the ‘voluntarist’ and ‘short-term’ outlook 
of the past, with many firms regarding the levy-grant system as an additional 
tax burden impacting negatively on cost structure and profit margins (Kraak, 
2005: 449). 
                                                          
4
 The ups and downs of training. 31 October 2002, Posted in NumsaNews 
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 Firms that traditionally trained began to abdicate their responsibility upon the 
introduction of the skills levy as they viewed government to be taking over that 
responsibility (Abrahams, 2014: 50). 
 Firms’ abandoning their responsibility in favour of training that is short-term, 
cheaper, and less demanding in order to claim back the grant (Kraak, 2005). 
 
Even more worrying is that a significant number of registered small firms (only 17 
511 out of a total of 181 842) have not claimed back mandatory grants during NSDS 
I that may indicate that they are not actively participating in SETA activities and 
structures (Department of Labour, 2005). The national skills development system is 
destined to fail if firms do not open up their workplaces for training.  
 
3.9.2.5. Emerging Policy Interventions During NSDS I 
3.9.2.5.1. Skills Development Amendment Act  
The disjunction between firm-activity and SETAs was not the only concern. There 
was also a disconnect between government and SETAs as well as a perception that 
the SDA does not allow the Ministers of Labour and/ or Education to intervene in the 
work of the SETAs. To ensure the accountability of SETAs to government the 
Minister of Labour led the promulgation of the Skills Development Amendment Act 
(No 31 of 2003). The Singizi Report identified the major amendments to the SDA: 
 ‘amending the Minister’s regulation-making powers to prescribe requirements 
for the performance of SETA functions including-  
• standards and criteria for the allocation of grants to employers, 
education and training providers and workers; and  
• standards and criteria for the use of monies received by SETAs, 
including expenditure on administration and salary bands and 
performance related payments in relation to staff; 
 providing for the amalgamation and dissolution of SETAs; 
 requiring that SETAs conclude annual service level agreements with the 
Director-General: Labour concerning the performance of their functions under 
the Act and the National Skills Development Strategy, their annual business 
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plans and any assistance to be provided to the SETA by the Director-General 
in order to enable it to perform its functions; 
 empowering the Minister to issue written instructions to SETAs where they fail 
to perform their functions or comply with service level agreements, do not 
manage their finances in accordance with the SDA or where their membership 
is not representative of their constituencies or they have not prepared and 
implemented an employment equity plan as contemplated under the 
Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998; 
 requiring SETAs to ensure that their membership is representative of 
designated groups (black people, women and people with disabilities); 
 requiring SETAs to be managed in accordance with the PFMA; 
 extending the grounds on which the Minister may take over the administration 
of a SETA to include the failure by a SETA to comply with its service level 
agreement or with an instruction issued to it by the Minister of Labour; and  
 by adding an additional statutory function - promoting the national standard of 
good practice on skills development.’ 
(Singizi Report, 2007: 56) 
 
The amendments allowed the Minister of Labour to intervene and place a SETA in 
administration in cases including failure to implement an instruction from the 
Minister; failure to comply with a service level agreement SETAs are supposed to 
have with the Minister; and maladministration.  
 
3.9.2.5.2. Mergers 
Emboldened by the SDA amendments, the Minister of Labour had a tool to use 
against SETAs deemed as inefficient and underperforming. Towards the end of 
NSDS I the Minister announced the formation of SASSETA effectively merging the 
poorly performing POSLEC with DIDTETA to form the new entity. It did not really 
help as SASSETA, paralysed by the merger, went on to receive a qualified audit 
from the Auditor-General. Nonetheless, together with the merger of the SETAs in the 
agriculture sector this move effectively reduced the SETAs from 25 to 23. The move 
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indicated to SETAs that the Minister can use his powers to deal with underachieving 
SETAs run by inactive Boards.  
 
3.9.3. NSDS II: 2005 - 2011 
3.9.3.1. Two Centres of Power, Continued 
The two Departments of Labour and Education continued to share the SDA objectives. 
Likewise, their fight over turf and relevance continued unabated. In 2007 the 
Department of Education took a decision to change the curriculum of the then FET 
colleges beginning a controversial process to phase out the popular technical 
programmes called NATED or N courses. Even though, the N courses were designed 
to form the theoretical base for apprenticeship programmes, they were being phased 
out without consulting the Department of Labour and business, which saw them as key 
pillars of the SDA5. 
 
3.9.3.2. Apathy of the Firms 
If the poor submissions of WSPs and ATRs by firms are anything to go by, not all firms 
are interested in working with SETAs. The WSPs provides useful information about 
skills and employment trends in the sector and sub-sectors. That so few firms submit 
WSPs may point to a major problem – employer apathy towards skills development. 
This weakness leads to a disjunction between the SETA strategy and firms’ levels of 
skills and training activities. There is a body of evidence showing firms’ general 
disregard for workplace training during NSDS II and, therefore, firms often participate 
negligibly in skills development activities. Despite the rhetoric to transform factory 
floors into training sites, companies placed profits before collective objectives such 
as responding to the challenges of scarce and critical skills. Patel (2014) noted that 
out of the 280 000 engineering diploma class of 2000, only 34% managed to be 
placed in employment. If these diplomates were enrolled into workplace-based 
learning programmes to enhance their employability that would have gone a long 
way in minimising the country’s skills shortage confronting firms. Without firms’ 
                                                          
5
 Merseta. (2008). Skills Sector Plan. Johannesburg: Merseta 
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optimum participation the result continued to be inadequate skills audits and poor 
skills demand and supply forecasts during this period.   
 
Mummenthey and others (2012: 37) reported that some firms are doing training for 
all the wrong reasons such as receiving ‘the grant’. They also note that firms ‘don’t 
want learners to qualify’ for fear of having to pay them better salaries and the 
difficulty of being ‘stuck to the SETA qualification’ (ibid). This ‘free riding’ added to 
market failure in the delivery of workplace training, with employers lacking motivation 
to embark on training but ready to entice skilled and trained workers away from firms 
that had invested in workplace-integrated learning.  
 
3.9.3.3. Poor Participation Rates 
The number of learners registered with SETAs is too low to make a significant 
contribution to the skills shortages challenges identified as South Africa’s major 
binding constraint towards economic growth. Table 3.2 indicates the number of 
learners registered for learnerships at both the beginning and the end of NSDS II. 
   
Table 3.2: SETA Learnership Registration across Time 
Item 2005/06 2009/10 
Learners registered 53 644 43 569 
NQF Level (mode) 4 2 
Age (mean) 28 28 
Adapted from Van Renburg et al. (2012)  
 
The data shows that more learners are registering at lower NQF levels. This may 
signify that more is being done to improve numeracy and illiteracy, a key ingredient 
to upgrade to highly needed intermediate skills. Nonetheless, the worry is that the 
country is not registering the scarcer intermediate, vocation and artisanal skills that 
are at higher NQF Levels. It is also worrying that the number of learners taken in by 
the SETA system is dropping rather than increasing. The 19% drop in registrations is 
a step in the wrong direction for skills development.  
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Even more harrowing some investigators report that the completion rates of those 
who registered for learnerships during the NSDS II period was also low. Mahlong 
(2009) puts the number of the learners who completed their training between 2005 
and 2007 at 19%. More optimistic figures are provided by Kruss, et al. (2014) who 
found that 65% of those registered in 2005 had completed their training by 2007. 
Even so, the 35% dropout rate in two years is still woefully high as most learnerships 
are designed to be completed in a period of one year.  
 
During the financial year 2009/10 only 9 261 people registered for apprenticeship 
(Van Rensburg et al.: 2012). Elliot (2009) counted 12 661 in the previous year. This 
26% drop does not augur well for a country that has a critical shortage of artisanal 
skills believed to be in the region of 60 000 (Republic of South Africa, 2010). It takes 
between two to four years for an apprentice to complete training and qualify to sit for 
a trade test. And completion rates, according to Van Renburg et al. (2012), are no 
more than 50%. Table 3.3 shows the number of candidates that sit and pass their 
trade exams. 
 
Table 3.3: Number of appointments arranged, met and passed from 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2010 
Section Arranged   Absent   Tested   Passed   Pass% 
Automotive engineering   1 666   321   1 345   499   37% 
Electrical engineering   2 360   330   2 030   977  48% 
Mechanical engineering   1 111    145 966   227   23% 
Services / Manufacturing and Process   972     146 826   360   44% 
Physical Planning and Construction   3 337     490 2 847   1 258   44% 
Total  9 446   1 432   8 014   3 321   41% 
Source: Van Rensburg et al. (2012: 71) 
 
In fact, only 3 321 completed their artisanal training in 2009/10. Barclay (2012), 
Marock (2010) and Turner, et al. (2013) blamed this underperformance on SETA 
inefficiency, poor planning and coordination, maladministration and poor 
governance. 
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3.9.3.4. A Crisis of Governance and Administration 
SETAs are often blamed for attracting negative media attention. This poor public 
image is as a result of poor service delivery primarily attributed to poor corporate 
governance, employer apathy, and the disjuncture between SETA strategy and firm-
level activity, thus making the authorities the most censured entities in post-
democratic South Africa (Barclay, 2012; Marock, et al., 2008). Poor governance, 
maladministration, poor planning and the general negativity around SETAs 
consistently undermine skills development. The SDA provides for SETAs to develop 
their constitutions to regulate their conduct. The Singizi Report (2007: 76) reviewed 
the constitutions of the SETAs and uncovered a number of weaknesses that may be 
responsible for the poor governance and maladministration endemic with SETAs. 
The Singizi Report identified, among others, the following: 
 Big SETA Boards  
 Insufficient eligibility criteria for members 
 No membership disqualification 
 No standard provision for governing body remuneration 
 No standard provision for codes of ethical conduct 
 Unlawful delegations 
 No standard specifications of the role and functions of the chief executive 
officer 
 Limited mechanisms for stakeholder participation 
It is worrying that some SETAs do not make provisions for the code of conduct, 
remuneration and disqualification of members of the governing bodies to ensure only 
ethical, competent and dedicated people run these critical bodies. Using the findings 
of the Auditor-General and SETA documents such as SSPs, Marock and others 
(2008) reported that three SETAs scored below 50% benchmark on planning, six 
scored 50% and below on governance and no less than 12 scored below 50% on 
quality assurance, a measure directly related to SETA mandate. Scott and 
Shuttleworth (2007) reported similar findings. Turner, et al. (2013) used cash 
reserves and an input-output model to measure efficiency, and concluded that only 
11 of the 23 SETAs were efficient.  
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3.9.3.5. The Blame Game 
Employers blamed SETAs for ‘shirking’ their responsibilities to engage in in-factory 
training, and vice versa. A study commissioned by Busa (2009: 9) found that 
employers have simply opted out of the system because SETAs classify skills as 
‘scarce’ just to push large numbers through learning programmes under their 
jurisdiction. This apparent mistrust between SETAs and firms confirmed National 
Business Initiative’s (2007) earlier observation that found that 47% of companies felt 
SETAs are not supportive of their skills priorities. Lamenting graduate unemployment 
in post‐apartheid South Africa, the Development Policy Research Unit (DPRU) 
(2007) noted that the few firms not accusing SETAs of mismanagement and 
cumbersome bureaucracy as a reason for not opening their workplaces for 
learnerships were the ones represented in SETA Boards.  
 
‘The majority of firms interviewed indicated that they could only expand their 
learnership programmes if the grants were increased to such an extent that all 
administrative costs were covered since the current intake of learners were 
invariably based on the firms’ needs’ (DPRU, 2006: 37). 
 
This raised the issue of marginal subsidies as a policy option, wherein, the 
autonomous decision of the employer subsidises additional workers taken on over 
and above the workers the firm was going to train in any case. 
 
3.9.3.6. Evolving Policy Interventions  
3.9.3.6.1. Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition  
Despite the emergence of SETAs, the implementation of the NSDS continued to show 
that one of the major drawbacks of the national skills development system is the weak 
partnership of state, business and labour. Aiming to resolve this institutional weakness, 
government established the Joint Initiative on Priority Skills Acquisition (JIPSA) in 
March 2006. Even though JIPSA was designed to be a short term intervention, some of 
its objectives read like that of SETAs:  
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• lead the implementation of a joint initiative of government, business and 
organised labour to accelerate the provision of priority skills;  
 mobilise senior leadership in business, government, organised labour and 
institutions concerned with education and training and science and technology 
to address national priorities in a more coordinated and targeted way;  
 promote greater relevance and responsiveness in the education and training 
system and strengthen the employability of graduates;  
 lay the foundations for more coordinated and effective skills development 
strategies;  
 lead an effective programme to communicate JIPSA’s objectives and consult 
with stakeholders.  
This duplication of duties identifies the major challenge of skills development in South 
Africa that is mainly the weak partnership and the failure of SETAs to build and 
establish that relationship as well as the reluctance of employers to invest in training. 
Even though short-lived, the JIPSA intervention managed to revive the apprenticeship 
system and increase the number of artisans in training (Van Rensburg, et al., 2012). 
 
3.9.3.6.2. Skills Development Amendment Act, of 2008 
In the middle of the NSDS II period government announced another amendment to 
the SDA. The Skills Development Amendment Act, assented on 27 November 2008, 
sought to reduce the scope of SETAs. Establishing the Quality Council for Trades 
and Occupations (QCTO) the changes took away the role of quality assurance of 
qualifications away from SETAs and into the new council (Republic of South Africa, 
2008b). Furthermore, the shift also introduced the formation of a National Artisan 
Moderating Body to regulate the decentralisation of trade assessment across the 
country. By so doing government hoped that disabused of the burden to develop 
qualifications, SETAs will now focus more on their mandate, and that, workplace 
training including the promotion of learnerships and other work integrated learning 
programmes. The Skills Development Amendment Act, of 2008, finally repealed one 
of the mainstay legislation of the apartheid era, the Manpower Training Act.  
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3.9.3.6.3. One Centre of Power 
Towards the end of NSDS II in 2009 President Jacob Zuma announced a new 
Department of Higher Education and Training (DHET) to focus on post-school 
education and training. The formation of the department led to the dissolution of the 
Department of Education and the establishment of the Department of Basic 
Education to focus on basic education. DHET also took all the functions related to 
skills development and labour market intelligence from the Department of Labour.  
For SETAs this meant that they would be accountable to one Minister. This move 
ended the two centres of power in the skills development landscape. It meant that the 
functions of SETAs would then be a coordinated from a single department.  
 
3.10. NSDS III: 2011 to 2016 
3.10.1. Another SDA Amendment 
It is tricky to evaluate the SETA performance during this period as it is still in 
progress. But there are some major policy signals that policy makers are following 
with a keen eye. The first area of interest is the impact of the amendment to the SDA 
that would give more powers to government to act against SETAs perceived as 
truant and underperforming. Related to the powers of the Minister is the ongoing 
court case between the Minister of Higher Education and Training and Busa over 
mandatory grants and spending of surplus funds. The third one relates to the taking 
over of SETA administration by the Ministry of Higher Education and Training noting 
the number of SETAs placed on administration during this period (Republic of South 
Africa, 2015).  
 
The NSDS III began with a bang. The SETAs have been reduced from 23 to 21. The 
announcement that the mandatory grant has been reduced led to court challenges. 
But of significance was the Skills Development Amendment Act of 2011 giving 
provisions relating to the establishment, amalgamation and dissolution of SETAs 
(Republic of South Africa, 2012). Responding to concerns of SETA Board’s lack of 
professionalism, the new regulations prescribed, among others, to: 
 
 ‘provide for the incorporation of a subsector of one SETA into another SETA;  
 provide for the composition of an Accounting Authority for each SETA;  
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 regulate the eligibility to become a member of an Accounting Authority;  
 provide for a constitution for every SETA;  
 regulate the conduct of a member of an Accounting Authority, or of a member 
of the staff, of a SETA when engaging in business with the SETA;  
 require members of Accounting Authorities to disclose any conflict of interest 
with the relevant SETA.’ 
 
Despite introducing the criteria for serving in a SETA Board and the appointment of 
CEOs, the new changes reduced the size of SETA Boards. The Singizi Report 
(2007) had criticized the huge SETA Boards for operating as bargaining councils 
taking too long to reach decisions. Many studies had laid the blame of the failure to 
implement the levy-grant skills development system firmly on lack of professionalism, 
corruption, poor governance, and maladministration (Marock et al., 2008; Scott & 
Shuttleworth, 2007; Barclay, 2012). It seems the new changes are an effort to 
remedy the crisis of governance. Even so, the Skills Development Amendment Act, 
of 2011, also gave the Minister sweeping powers to take over the administration of 
underperforming SETAs.  
 
  
3.10.2. Mandatory Grants Reduced without Consultation 
As a solution to what it perceived as misuse of the mandatory grants, the newly 
established DHET published new SETA grant regulations regarding monies SETAs 
receive as well as surplus fund. The regulations required SETAs, as of 01 April 2013, 
to allocate no more than 10.5% of the total levies paid to administration costs and to 
shift a sum not greater than 0.5 % of the total levy paid to the QCTO. These shifts 
recommended that mandatory grants be reduced from 50 to 20%. Every SETA must 
allocate 80% of its discretionary grants within a financial year to PIVOTAL 
programmes that address scarce and critical skills, and failure to do so will lead the 
SETA to lose the unspent money to the National Skills Fund to be used for other 
national skills development initiatives. PIVOTAL grants can be defined as 
professional, vocational, technical and academic learning programmes that result in 
a qualification or part qualification registered on the NQF. The new regulations also 
entitled employers to 80% (in addition to the 20% mandatory grant) of their 
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contribution to the skills levy in discretionary grants (or PIVOTAL grant) if they can 
submit a PIVOTAL plan to the SETA. With this regulations government is trying to 
discourage the use of skills budget towards short courses that does not lead to a 
qualification or part qualification.  
 
Employers will have to start implementing PIVOTAL grants to guarantee access to 
the discretionary fund.  PIVOTAL grants will offer learners the prospect of completing 
a practical part of their qualification to obtain their qualifications. This will curb the 
persisting problems of many learners that cannot graduate because they do not have 
the opportunity to complete their practical training (Allais & Nathan, 2012). 
Responding to the weaknesses of the labour-employer-SETA tripartite relationship, 
the NSDS III provided for a more active role for the SETAs. By increasing the 
incentives for firms to train more, the PIVOTAL grant will allow learners not only to 
graduate but also to get invaluable work and industry experience that will make them 
more employable. But the regulations also led to unintended consequences. Full 
implementation of the NSDS III was delayed6. The announcement of the new 
regulations rattled the tripartite partnership to the core, as it effectively shifts the 
power to control the allocation of skills funds in favour of the department. Some 
businesses represented in the SETA Boards were furious and threatened litigation 
(Freeman, 2011).  
 
3.10.3. The Age of Litigation 
Representing the majority of big firms, Busa challenged the reduction of the 
mandatory grant by the Minister of Higher Education and Training. The amendment 
also required unspent SETA funds to be allocated to the National Skills Fund for 
national skills development initiatives rather than remaining in the SETA to be used 
by the sector for workplace training in that sector. Busa failed to persuade the 
Minister to reconsider the regulations, and resorted to legal action. On 7 August 2015, 
the Labour Court set aside both regulations with effect from 31 March 2016. The court 
blamed the Minister for not consulting the National Skills Authority and exceeding his 
powers by prescribing that unspent SETA funds be transferred to the National Skills 
                                                          
6
 Merseta. (2012). Workplace Skills Plan data 2012/13-2016/17 - UPDATED.  Johannesburg: Merseta. 
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Fund. Busa released a statement hailing the decision as a confirmation of ‘the 
importance of workplace skills training programmes in South Africa’.  
 
Minister Blade Nzimande promised a legal counter-offensive on businesses accusing 
them of being unpatriotic by wasting money on one-two-week courses.7 In line with the 
White Paper on Post-school Education and Training, which proposed the reshaping of 
the levy-grant system to ensure levies are directed to the public education and training 
system, the Minister is intending to change SETA Boards from independent 
‘Authorities’ to ‘Advisory Boards’ with a government official equipped with veto 
powers.8 As the loss against Busa is likely to be a banana skin for the Minister’s policy 
reforms, he has appealed the ruling (ibid). 
 
 
3.10.4.You Are Now Under Administration 
On 26 February 2014 former Chief of Staff of the Ministry of Higher Education and 
Training Nqaba Nqandela, now Administrator and Acting CEO of the Local 
Government SETA (LG SETA), joked in a session of the Parliamentary Portfolio 
Committee on Higher Education and Training that while the Services SETA was 
coming out of administration, the LG SETA had just been placed under administration. 
This may have been a humorous anecdote but the Ministry’s taking over of Services 
SETAs, in administration for two and a half years, signalled an era of a Ministry that 
was willing to use its powers to deal with SETAs that are not toeing the line. The 
Services SETA could not account for some of its allocations, and was reported to have 
been paying for a learner’s one year skills programme an amount equal to three years 
of university education.9 Earlier, in 2011, the Construction, Energy and Water as well 
as the Public Service SETAs were placed on administration for ‘compromises in 
governance’.10 Two more SETAs, SASSETA and CATHSETA also placed under 
administration taking the number of SETAs placed under administration during the 
                                                          
7
 http://citizen.co.za/843381/nzimande-on-the-warpath/ 
8
 http://city-press.news24.com/Business/blade-nzimande-set-to-scrap-setas-20151115 
9
 SETAs under administration: Local Government SETA and Services SETA Annual Reports 2012/13.  
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/16985/ 
10
 http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2011/03/30/construction-seta-placed-under-administration) 
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NSDS III period to eight.11 Many may applaud the Minister for finally acting against 
truant SETAs but some may view this as evidence of a system in crisis.  
  
                                                          
11
 Sector Education & Training Authorities SASSETA and CATHSSETA on their 2015 Strategic Plans. 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/20751/ 
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CHAPTER 4: SETA GOVERNANCE: THEORY, HYPOTHESES AND 
EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
The study embraces an analytic narrative approach and uses process tracing to 
examine how macro level processes interact with local level context to create 
disincentives (and incentives) to develop scarce and critical skills at a sectorial level 
within the interface of the private and public stakeholders. 
 
4.2. THE ANALYTICAL THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The agency theory hypothesised that managers are hired to look after the interests 
of shareholders (in this case the public), but managers sometimes act in their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Hailemariam, 2001; Jensen, Murphy & 
Wruck, 2004). Even though optimum value can be derived from implementing 
projects supporting organisational strategy, one in three of all strategy 
implementations fail as there is often a major rift between strategy (as designed by 
principals) and projects (as implemented by agents) (Buys & Stander, 2010).  
 
Even so, SETAs are unique because of the multiplicity of its principals, objectives 
and beneficiaries. The chain of principal-agent accountabilities suggested by Levy 
(2014) is tricky to employ due to the uniqueness of the SETA institutional 
arrangements at Board level. Even though, Board members are appointed by the 
Minister of Higher Education and Training, they are nominated and serve because of 
their affiliation to the constituency they represent such as a union or a business 
association. Most members of the Board will, therefore, have multiple principals. 
According to the SDA every Board member is appointed to serve on his or her own 
volition based on their skills and experience, and not to serve any vested interests. 
But using the principal-agent theoretical explanation, the challenges for SETAs 
remain at two levels. 
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First, for both labour and business, there are challenges that emanates within each 
of the respective constituencies’ principal-agent problem. As members of a SETA 
Board, individuals ‘represent’ a constituency (as their principal), but they are required 
to report to the Minister (another principal) in order to serve the policy beneficiaries 
(arguably another principal). These members (as agents) are also required to act 
with autonomy based on their own perceptions and those of the collective interest. 
 
Second, the principal-agent problem manifests itself in the interaction of the Board 
and its management. In this relationship the SETA governing Board assumes the 
role of a principal and the SETA management that of the agent. Given the multiplicity 
of principals and its concomitant challenges, and using the approach laid out in Levy 
(2014: 154), managers have autonomy and discretion that they can use for either 
private gain or for the collective good. The stakeholders must work together to 
optimise joint benefits which will temper their temptation to otherwise shirk, free ride 
or become selfish at the expense of the collective.  
 
Using the collective action analytical framework, the paper borrows from Nobel Prize 
winner Elinor Ostrom’s work on ‘common-pool resources’ governance to illuminate 
the interface of stakeholders trying to achieve mutually beneficial targets while 
battling each other’s temptations to shirk, free ride, or capture the public initiative for 
private purposes. The concept of a ‘common-pool resource’ is defined as ‘a natural 
or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not 
impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use,’ 
(Ostrom, 2005: 30).  
 
Premised on constructs often used in the models designed to explore the many 
problems that beset individuals when faced with the dilemma of choosing between 
private and collective benefits, namely, the tragedy of the commons; the prisoner's 
dilemma; and the logic of collective action, Ostrom (2005) had identified ‘good 
practice’ guiding principles to analyse the governance of institutions. According to 
Hardin (1968) cited in Ostrom (2005: 2) the ‘tragedy of the commons’ represents the 
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predictable degradation of a resource when private people are expected to derive a 
benefit from its collective consumption. In a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ the individual(s) are 
better off pursuing private benefits than the collective welfare (ibid). The ‘logic of 
collective action’ dispels the view that individuals will always act in the best interest 
of the collective: 
‘...unless there is coercion or some other special device that will make 
individuals act in their common interest, rational, self-interested individuals will 
not act to achieve their common or group interests’ (Olson, 1965: 2). 
Rules provide the ‘special device’ to tame individual interests in the favour of multi-
stakeholder benefits. Table 4.1 outlines the working and related rules necessary to 
allow the governance of ‘common pool resources’ to take root in a manner that 
encourages cooperative action and discourages private gain at the expense of the 
collective including shirking and free riding.   
 
Table 4.1: Institutional analysis framework 
Working Rules Related Rules Good Practice 
Eligibility rules Boundary: who is eligible to enter?   Clear and locally understood 
boundaries between legitimate 
participants and non-participants 
are present. 
Position: what positions participants 
can access?  
Operating rules Pay-off: what are the rewards and 
sanctions? 
Rules specifying the amounts that a 
participant benefits are proportional 
to the distribution of labour, 
materials and other costs. 
Aggregation: what collective 
decisions can be made? 
Most individuals affected by the 
collaborative initiative are 
authorised to participate in making 
and modifying its rules. 
Choice: what are the roles and 
duties of participants? 
Rapid, low-cost, local arenas exist 
for resolving conflicts among 
participants or with officials. This 
includes graduated sanctions for 
violating rules. 
Monitoring rules Information: what language/ form/ 
communication flows? 
Monitors who actively audit 
participant behaviour are at least 
partially accountable to the 
participants and/or are the 
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participants themselves. 
Delegation rules Operational: what decisions can be 
made in sphere of control? 
The rights of participants to set 
rules (or participate in rulemaking) 
are recognised by the government 
and organised in multiple nested 
layers, with a clearly defined, 
autonomous domain of decision-
making for local-level collective 
action. 
Collective: what collective activities/ 
decision can be made at what 
level? 
Constitutional: what are the rights 
of actors? 
Adapted from Ostrom (2005: 14) 
Used to regulate eligibility; rewards and sanctions; do’s and don’ts; procedures; 
information sharing methods; enforcement and rights of agents, these working rules 
defines what the institution is all about and the arrangements that governs how it 
conducts itself.  
 
Even with governance institutions firmly established, individuals or groups looking to 
capture the benefits of publicly owned agencies for private purposes may still do so. 
According to Levy (2001; 2014), riding roughshod over the formal and informal rules 
of the game for private purposes, or aptly predation, manifest itself in the following 
manner:  
 Predators brush aside the formal and informal rules of the game with 
impunity. 
 Predators use their powerful socio-political networks to exempt themselves 
from punishment, sanction or loss. 
Nonetheless, these ‘threats’ can be ‘trumped’ if protagonists are willing to leverage 
on their own powerful networks to counter predators in pursuit of the collective 
benefits for the public. Figure 4.1 provides an excellent decision tree of predation 
and trumping and its consequences.  
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Figure 4.1: Predation and trumping consequences 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Adapted from Levy (2001) 
Understanding the interaction of individual incentives, collective action and 
performance is key in this paper’s analysis. Process tracing completes the analysis 
in testing the hypotheses. 
 
4.3. HYPOTHESES 
Based on the principal-agent theory and multi-stakeholder governance, governing 
Board members of state-owned enterprises and senior managers may use their 
power to act either in their own interest or in pursuit of the public sector mandate. To 
this end, the paper hypothesises that: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The alignment of SETA strategy with the NSDS depends on the 
extent of commitment of the social partners to govern in their collective interest. 
Strong incentives of the key social partners to adequately govern will foil free loading 
and shirking thus preventing individual and groups from capturing the public initiative 
for private purposes. Flowing directly from this hypothesis are two key theoretical 
questions for sustainable workplace learning and training:  
 
Collaborative Governance 
Undermined  
Are Trumping 
Resources 
Strong?  
Do 
Collaborating 
Actors Resist?  
Does 
Agent 
Threaten?  
                                                            NO 
YES 
YES 
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Effective 
Collaborative 
Governance  
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Hypothesis 2: SETAs are failing to respond to the collective incentives of the social 
partners. 
SETAs are designed to act as intermediaries between government, on the one hand, 
and firms, training providers, and beneficiaries, on the other. Strengthening multi-
stakeholder partnership will harness the interests of the key stakeholders towards 
the attainment of NSDS objectives.   
 
Hypothesis 3: SETA Boards fail to act on behalf of the interests of the social 
partners because of the breakdown of the agent-principal linkages. 
The agent-principal theory explains that it should be expected that individuals would 
act to pursue their own private ends rather than those of the NSDS. There is also a 
high likelihood that in the case of prevalent predation, SETA service delivery will 
suffer, and vice versa.  
 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to assess whether the hypothesis is useful in 
explaining what is observed. Based on the evidence and process tracing 
observations, the hypotheses driving this study can be refutable. Mahoney (2010) 
defined the signals drawn from observing and analysing a single case as ‘causal 
process observations’ (CPOs). The CPOs are then used to inductively construct 
theory and to test hypotheses. Table 4.2 shows that the four evidence-based tests 
bracing up the theory building in process-tracing. 
 
Table 4.2: Process tracing evidence-based tests 
Test Result What it means 
Straw-in-the-Wind  Pass Increases the plausibility of the hypothesis in question but does not 
confirm it. 
Fail Weakens the hypothesis but does not eliminate it. 
Hoop  Pass Increases the plausibility of the hypothesis but does not confirm it. 
Fail It is eliminated. 
Smoking-Gun Pass Confirms the hypothesis. 
Fail Does not eliminate the hypothesis. 
Doubly-Decisive  Pass Confirms the hypothesis and eliminates rivals. 
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Adapted from Collier (2011: 825) 
 
The stress tests can be categorised as required to claim causation (hoop; doubly-
decisive), satisfactory (smoking-gun; doubly-decisive), or inconclusive (straw-in-the-
wind) (Collier, 2011). These categories provide a set of rules intended to increase 
the probability of solving some causation. For instance, the smoking-gun test may be 
regarded as strongly affirming a hypothesis, and not confirming it without doubt. 
Despite often focusing on only a single case, George and Bennett (2005) is of the 
view that process tracing is a useful tool for testing theories and hypothetical 
description of a complex entity or process. The next sub section describes the 
empirical strategy employed in this study. 
 
4.4. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
In order to test the proposed theoretical hypotheses, this study will, in line with 
George and Bennett (2005), examine a number of historical records and archival 
documents such as newspapers, annual reports, plans, the National Learners’ 
Records Database (NLRD) and other similar sources of information. This study 
selected Merseta, one of the biggest and well-resourced SETAs, to examine and 
trace how national processes such as the NSDS phases are connected (or 
disconnected) with the governance, political and institutional context within SETAs. 
This would then show whether these linkages are able to incentivise (or hinder) 
social partners to work together for the collective good that is implementing national 
skills development. Process tracing traces causal mechanism and sequences 
(Beach & Pedersen, 2013). Performing a within-case analysis based on qualitative 
data, the narrative of analytic narratives establishes the key players, their goals, their 
preferences, and the effective rules (including constraints and incentives) that 
influence the behaviours of role players (Collier, 2011; George & Bennett, 2005). 
Providing a textured explanation of context and process, the analytical narrative is an 
account of the set of facts or circumstances that surround a situation or event 
concerned with both sequence and temporality (Levi, n.d).  
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Encompassing selecting a problem, clarifying the logic of the explanation, elucidating 
the key decision points and possibilities, and finally evaluating the model, the 
analytic narrative process is a suitable instrument for judging ‘causality in situations 
where temporal sequencing, particular events, and path dependence must be taken 
into account’ (Mahoney, 1999: 1164). Based on building models to elaborate the 
strategic interactions that produce an equilibrium that constrains some actions and 
facilitates others, an analytics approach is suitable for understanding the governance 
make up and challenges of SETAs as it emphasises the identification of the reasons 
for the shift from an institutional equilibrium at one point in time to a different 
institutional equilibrium at a different point in time. The empirical strategy will, 
therefore, be able to uncover ‘what happened’ and ‘why it happened’ during 
particular periods of the implementation of the NSDS. 
 
With process tracing, the researcher combines earlier reasoning with specific 
observations from within a single case to iteratively make causal inferences about 
that case under investigation (Mahoney, 2012). Using the Merseta as a case study to 
explore skills development within the interface of the public and private sectors, 
process tracing tests can be used to help establish the initial events, related 
processes and causal mechanisms, and their concomitant outcomes. Process 
tracing lends itself to game theoretic models that are not only capable of testing 
hypotheses but also of generating alternative hypotheses when pre-existing 
explanations are disproved (George & Bennett, 2005). A key point here is that 
analytic narratives can add inferential leverage that is often lacking in quantitative 
analysis (George & Bennett, 2005) by providing careful description and close 
attention to sequences of independent, dependent, and intervening variables 
(Mahoney, 2010: 31). 
 
Embracing an analytic narrative approach, the study used process tracing to retrace 
Merseta’s governance history in order to uncover the hypothesised causal 
mechanism. The study was an attempt to paint a comprehensive picture of the SETA 
environment using the developments and experiences of the Merseta as a skills 
development intermediary within the interface of the public and private sectors. To 
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this end, the paper sought to explore Merseta’s governance in relation to the NSDS. 
Every five years the NSDS-driven skills development environment is reviewed 
leading to changes in the allocation of the skills levy-grant system and focus. Taking 
good snapshots at a series of specific moments, and focusing on the unfolding of 
events or situations over time would reveal Merseta’s governance overtime and its 
interaction with NSDS changes. It would also be revealing to note how SETA 
activities such as corruption, maladministration and other struggles within the SETA 
are connected with the organisation’s output or ability to implement its mandate. 
 
Digging into the budgetary allocations and grant spending patterns towards the 
implementation of workplace training and its alignment to the NSDS would be 
revealing of the type of governance and how it reacts to NSDS changes, if at all. As 
the NSDS III is still being implemented, the main focus of the paper would be on the 
implementation of the NSDS I and II. By and large NSDS I was fraught with teething 
challenges. Following a complete overhaul of the skills levy-grant system from NSDS 
II to III the paper would also trace the impact this change in strategy is expected to 
have (and having) on SETAs.   
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CHAPTER 5:  MERSETA: A PROCESS TRACING ANALYSIS  
 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Funded on the basis of payroll levies this three-party training system was innovative, 
sophisticated and proved a disruptive force to the established racialised training 
scheme. Establishing the SETAs was beset with to delays and other teething problems 
related to putting in place the appropriate infrastructure and systems. From the outset 
these challenges, coupled with the obligation to adhere to the requirements of the NQF, 
which was also new, compromised the planned outputs of the early years of the NSDS. 
 
5.2. OUTCOMES OVER TIME 
5.2.1. Skills Development Levy Payments 
Levy-paying companies contributed just over R6.5 billion to Merseta during the first 
10 years. Figure 5.1 shows that the SETA paid R2.5 billion in mandatory grants and 
R1.7 billion in discretionary grants (including projects).  
Figure 5.1: Merseta’s spend per type of grant (2000 -2010) 
 
Source: Merseta Annual Report 2013/14 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Mandatory 49 714 66 640 188 778 143 170 256 227 362 128 250 228 204 274 303 908 334 254 
Discretionary   22 144 51 530 83 794 125 061 102 719 107 811 69 114 171 534 248 928 
Projects 350 4 984 104 803 53 143 53 830 63 263 108 801 28 280 97 451 234 176 
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The immediate concern is that about 25% (as 10.5% is reserved for administration) 
of the levy ends up in reserves.  Another concern is that a large number of 
mandatory grants are spent in the lower NQF levels (mainly levels 1 and 2) rather 
than at the much-needed intermediary skills. Figure 5.2 provides a summary of the 
distribution of training opportunities and mandatory grants spending by companies in 
2013/14. 
 
Figure 5.2. Distribution of training opportunities and expenditure by Merseta companies 2013/14 
 
Source: Merseta Sector Skills Plan 2014-15 – 2018/19 
 
This observation demonstrated that companies in the Merseta sector tend to prefer 
short courses over apprenticeships, learnerships, and internships. The short courses 
do not result in qualifications or part qualifications but they may be cheaper and 
easier to source and customise. Data sourced from the National Learners’ Records 
Database (NLRD) also showed that a small number of learners enrol and achieve 
qualifications that are quality assured and reported by Merseta, as required by the 
NQF Act. Figure 5.3 shows that just over 21 000 Merseta-related qualifications were 
registered as achieved on the NQF.  
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Figure 5.3: Learners’ achievements on Seta-quality-assured qualifications registered on the NLRD 
 
Source: NLRD (own calculations) 
 
The numbers represent Merseta quality-assured qualifications learners have 
achieved in the first 10 years of the SETA. It is revealing of the unpopularity of 
Merseta sanctioned qualifications in the Merseta sector. This low appetite for 
Merseta qualifications is odd as the qualifications are supposed to be a by-product of 
the labour-employer social compact in the sector. Spending on short courses seems 
to be out of line with the expectation that companies in the manufacturing and 
engineering sectors would prioritise the development of the scarce and critical skills 
obtainable largely through Merseta-sanctioned vocational and technical training such 
as apprenticeships and internships.  
 
5.2.2. Apprentices, Learners and Skills Programmes 
Discretionary grants afford an excellent opportunity for SETAs to implement the 
objectives of the NSDS, as they are allocated at the sole discretion of the SETA. 
Discretionary grants and reserves (through the short-medium term Sector Skills Plan 
(SSP)) are committed to signed contracts and approved plans and they apply to 
learnerships, apprenticeships, and special projects that continue implementation in 
ensuing years to implement the NSDS.  
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Figures 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6 further expand on ‘bums on seats’ in the first 10 years of 
the SETA. 
 
Figure 5.4: Number of apprentices that registered and qualified in the Merseta sector from 2002 to 2010 
 
Source:  Merseta QMR data 2014 (cited in Merseta 2014 SECTOR SKILLS PLAN UPDATE) 
 
Of the 46 311 apprentices registered with Merseta during the NSDS I and II period, 
only 52% qualified as artisans. Even more harrowing, the number of people Merseta 
register as apprenticeships were gradually reducing annually from a high of almost 
10 000 in 2002 to just over 5 000 in 2010.  
 
Even so, the apprentices in the Merseta sector at the end of June 2009 shows a 
disjunction between SETA strategy and the type of apprenticeships firms are willing 
to take. Table 5.1 shows that unlike the Metal chamber (with 58% of the total 
apprenticeships), firms in other sub-sectors are not as interested in in-factory 
training. 
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Table 5.1: Number of apprenticeships by chamber 
 
Source: Merseta (2012) 
 
Despite contributing 7% of total GDP during this period (NAAMSA, 2009) and 26% of 
all levies, the seven large automotive assemblers making up the Auto chamber had 
179 apprentices in 2009. Despite that, mechatronics technicians and mechanics 
listed in Merseta’s SSP as scarce skills were not part of the 179,12 again showing a 
disjunction between the Merseta’s labour market intelligence and. Likewise the Metal 
chamber had listed Metal Manufacturing Machine Setter and Minder as well as 
Crane, Hoist or Lift Operator as scarce skills but there is no investment towards 
these type of skills. Even though the millwright trade is perceived as scarce, 
employers avoid it as it includes two trades (electrical and mechanical), and takes 
longer. Mummenthey, Wildschut and Kruss (2012) found that this is because 
                                                          
12
 Merseta Sector Skills Plan 2009 Annual Review 
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employers to avoid investing time in some programmes because they take longer 
and consume more resources. 
 
Figure 5.5 shows that the number of learnerships tend to be cyclical, that is, lower in 
the beginning of the NSDS phase and higher towards the end of strategy such as in 
2004/05 and 2009/10.  
Figure 5.5: Number of learners that registered and qualified in the Merseta sector from 2002 to 2010 
 
Source: Merseta QMR data 2014 (cited in Merseta 2014 SECTOR SKILLS PLAN UPDATE) 
 
This cyclical nature of learnerships may point to a lack of adequate planning. The 
SETA seemed to be spending a lot of money once they realise the NSDS phase is 
coming to an end.   
 
Figure 5.6 demonstrates that skills programmes began to pick up in the second 
phase of the strategy following a very slow start in the first phase.  
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Figure 5.6: Number of learners in skills programmes from 2002 to 2010 
 
 
The completions of skills programmes are way too low with a dropout rate of about 
60%. Skills programmes allow SETAs to target specific skills needs that are peculiar 
to the sector such as retrenchment assistance plans, literacy and mathematics 
programmes. According to Numsa the bulk of workers in the Merseta sector have 
qualifications below NQF level 2, and so could not access further training13. For 
unions Adult Education and Training (AET) became a critical intervention but there 
was a disjunction between labour and employers. Reporting that only about 7% of 
firms within the SETA's domain are involved in providing AET training Mummenthey 
and others (2012) believed that the challenge is that employers tend to 
misunderstand the concept of AET. As a result they have not used it effectively to 
upgrade the lower echelons of the occupational ladder. In turn this constipates the 
pool of workers able to register for artisanships and other intermediate skills. 
 
5.3. NSDS I: THE EARLY YEARS 
5.3.1. Key Events During NSDS I 
Merseta is formed: Following the promulgation of the SDA and the subsequent 
establishment of the Merseta, the first phase of the NSDS was implemented from 2000 
                                                          
13
 The ups and downs of training. 31 October 2002, Posted in NumsaNews 
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to 2005. In the primary years of Merseta the Board functioned like a suspended 
bargaining council. They would not agree on a number of issues. Given the Board 
divisions, top managers were left to act like ‘agents with no principal’ – free to operate 
as they chose. Figure 5.1 charts what happened at Merseta during this period of 
leadership uncertainty, Board infighting over CEO positions, and the negative effect this 
had had on SETA CEOs. 
Figure 5.7: Key events during NSDS I 
 
The Merseta Board was constituted by the equal representation of both organised 
business (15 members) and unions (15 members), each with full voting rights. Built on 
the idea of a partnership between organised employers and labour unions, the SETAs 
had to contend with managing the training needs of such a diversified grouping. The 
Minister of Labour appointed Board members as per nominations from Merseta 
stakeholders. Looking after 50 000 firms with a total of about 655 967 employees, 
the Merseta sector14. Table 5.2 outlines the five Merseta chambers that make up the 
sector and the dominant business associations. 
 
Table 5.2: Merseta chambers and sub-sectors 
Chamber Description Sub-sector Business Association 
Metals Firms involved in the 
manufacturing and 
servicing of capital 
Capital Equipment Steel And Engineering 
Industries Federation 
Of South Africa 
Transport Equipment 
Metal Fabrication 
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 Merseta Annual Report 2012/13 
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equipment including 
transport equipment; 
(Seifsa) 
Auto South Africa’s seven 
large automotive 
assemblers, also 
known as original 
equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs); 
BMW South Africa, Nissan South 
Africa and Ford Motor Company South 
Africa are located in northern Gauteng;  
General Motors South Africa and 
Volkswagen South Africa are based in 
Port Elizabeth;  
Mercedes-Benz South Africa plant is in 
East London,  
Toyota South Africa is situated in 
Durban. 
Automobile 
Manufacturers 
Employers 
Organisation (AMEO) 
Motor Firms involved in the 
motor retail and service 
industries, as well as in 
the manufacture of 
automotive 
components; 
Components Retail Motor Industry 
Organisation (RMI) Motor Retail  
Motor Repair 
New Tyre Firms involved in the 
manufacture of new 
tyres; 
Manufacturing  New Tyre 
Aftermarket supply 
Plastics Firms involved in the 
manufacture of plastics 
products from locally 
manufactured and 
imported polymers. 
Polymer Producer  Plastics Federation 
Plastics Convertors  
Plastic Fabrication 
 
Both the workforce and firms of the Merseta sectors are highly organised. For 
instance, wage determination in the automotive assembly sub-sector takes place 
through non-statutory centralised bargaining arrangements between the National 
Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa) and the employer associations such 
as the Automobile Manufacturers Employers Organisation (AMEO) to which all 
seven local OEMs belong to. The Minister used these representations when 
appointing the first Merseta board. Figure 5.8 shows the representations of business 
and labour in the Merseta Board.   
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Figure 5.8: Board stakeholder representation during NSDS I 
 
 
The business associations representing the five chambers were represented equally in 
the Board with 3 members each. Business and labour nominated their own 
representatives. The Minister then appointed those representing organised labour 
and organised business in equal measure. In this Board there the Minister appointed 
no government officials. The CEO joined the Board as an ex officio. The Boards 
reflected its constituencies in line with Section 11 of the SDA. As a result of the 
emphasis on joint responsibility and co-determination, SETAs depended on the social 
partners working together in harmony. But in reality disunity plagued the Board for a 
better part of its first five years. Employers refused to release union representatives to 
take part in the many Merseta meetings and activities.  
 
Unions Boycott Merseta: In 2003 the labour boycotted meetings further paralysing 
the fledgling SETA. Malebo Mogopodi, Numsa’s National Training Coordinator and 
member of the Merseta Board, told Numsa News after Delta management summoned 
Saliem Dolley, Numsa’s representative in the Merseta’s Auto Chamber, to a 
disciplinary hearing for attending a Merseta meeting in company time that: 
‘Merseta as a skills training institution is meant to be a vehicle which is equally 
driven by all its stakeholders, meaning labour and business. If the principle of a 
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stakeholder driven Merseta is accepted by all parties as essential, why is it that 
business representatives do not have any constraints from participating in 
Merseta activities? Might it be that business wants to roll back and undermine 
the role labour has to play within Merseta?’ 
It took two more years of tough negotiations for labour to persuade the Board to allow 
stakeholders to have its own co-ordinators to assist with monitoring compliance to the 
SDA at the workplace. The conflict in the Board also opened up an opportunity for 
individuals (and groups) to capture the SETA for their private ends at the expense of 
joint benefits.  
 
The battles permeated the SETA chambers where business interest groups fought 
among themselves. Signals of shirking, free riding, or just wanting a bigger slice of the 
training pie for one’s sector were noticed between employer groups. Describing the 
process of preparing an SSP as an ‘arduous process, with the need to balance the 
tension between the different chambers, informants informed Mummenthey, et al. 
(2012) that organised businesses tend to clash in the chambers ‘over numbers in 
saying ours is a bigger problem than yours’ rather than focusing on the skills needs of 
the sector.  
 
The major organisational challenges that Merseta faced during the first five years was 
the management vacuum at both Board and executive management level. During this 
phase the SETA failed to fill a number of key vacancies. As a result programmes took 
longer than necessary to complete. Without proper leadership, Merseta was racked by 
serious corporate contraventions during NSDS I including hiring of companies for work 
ranging from curriculum formation to recruitment of learners and project management 
with no approval from the Board and, in some cases, directly undermining the Board’s 
decisions.   
 
Five CEOs in six years: From 2001 to 2006 Merseta hired and fired five CEOs. 
Pearce (2001 - 2002); Maluleke (2003 – 2005), Van Straten (2005) as well as Adams 
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and Van Rensburg (2006) were all CEOs in the first six years of the SETA. In the first 
three years Merseta saw two Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) resigning under a cloud 
of financial mismanagement, favouritism and non-compliance with policies and 
procedures. In 2005 there was even a dispute on who was in charge of running the 
SETA. Letsoalo wrote in the Mail & Guardian newspaper in defence of Maluleke, his 
client in a litigation case involving scandals of corruption, mismanagement and 
maladministration: 
‘Between April 2005 and December 2005, the Merseta employed Ms Betty van 
Straten as the CEO. Nothing which happened during the course of her 
employment in this capacity has anything to do with our client.’15  
 
Merseta seemed to be in a state of paralysis mainly as a result of the Board failing to 
realise a coherent identity, and rather operating as a bargaining council (Singizi Report, 
2007). The result of the disunity of the Board and management acting like agents 
without a principal resulted in the following observations: 
1. Key stakeholders in the form of unions boycotting Merseta. 
2. Incapacity to deliver. Merseta acknowledged that the capacity of its regions 
had become a serious problem in the delivery of its mandate16. 
3. Inability to spend on skills development: In 2004, with serious corporate 
contraventions tormenting Merseta, it failed to spend over R120-million meant 
for skills development training (Engineering News, 2003). Merseta’s 
aggregate surplus accumulation increased by more than threefold in one 
financial year to R217 million (Mummenthey, Wildschut & Kruss, 2012). 
4. Maladministration: Merseta criticised after it spent more than R8-million on 
consultants (Mismanagement of funds plagues many SAs Setas - Mail & 
Guardian 2007-04-24). 
5. Learning programmes took longer than necessary to complete. A case in 
point is the ground breaking partnership between Merseta, Continental Tyres 
and the Nelson Mandela Metro University designed to address critical skills 
identified within the tyre industry. Involving an initial intake of 19 learners the 
                                                          
15
Get your fact straight. http://mg.co.za/article/2007-06-15-september-14-to-20 
16
 Merseta. (2006). Annual Report 2005/02. Johannesburg: Merseta 
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learnership lasted for three years, instead of one as envisaged, due to 
capacity related challenges (Merseta 2006/07 Annual Report). 
6. The number of learnerships tends to be cyclical, that is, lower in the 
beginning of the NSDS phase and higher towards the end of strategy. The 
spike in registration of learnerships at the end of phase may be to fulfil 
targets rather training on required skills. 
7. Companies in the Merseta sector tend to prefer short courses over 
apprenticeships, learnerships, and internships. Merseta sanctioned 
qualifications are unpopular with employers. 
8. Some workers saw learnerships as cheap labour masquerading as training 
(NumsaNews, 2003).  
9. Employer charges Numsa’s representative in the Merseta’s Auto Chamber 
with gross misconduct for attending Merseta meetings (NumsaNews, 2004). 
10. Failure to fill a number of key vacancies even at its head office (Merseta 
2006/07 Annual Report). 
Observations on training output are as follows (own calculation using NLRD data and 
annual reports: 
1. High dropout rates: apprenticeship (52%) and skills programmes (60%). 
2. Low spending on skills: 35% of the levy is not spent on grants and training 
projects 
3. Mandatory grants spent in the lower NQF levels (mainly Levels 1 and 2) 
rather than at the middle skills level where there is the highest need 
The key events and observations pointed to a weak partnership especially between the 
two major protagonists – workers and business. The above observations showed that 
the lack of leadership undermined workplace training. The observations increased the 
plausibility of hypothesis 1 but it is not enough to confirm causality that the alignment of 
SETA strategy with the NSDS depended on the extent of commitment of the social 
partners to govern in their collective interest. 
 
However, there is credibility for hypothesis 2 and 3. During this phase Merseta failed 
to harness the collective incentives of the social partners (Hypothesis 2) largely 
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because of the breakdown of the agent-principal linkages (Hypothesis 3). The 
outcome was that key stakeholders either started shirking their responsibilities to the 
NSDS or used the SETA environment for personal gain. The theory of endemic 
corruption, shirking and freeloading as a result of poor governance is strongly 
affirmed. But the theory that stakeholders with strong incentives towards skills 
development will prevent predation is not confirmed, which may mean that at this 
stage the incentives of stakeholders to work together for joint benefits was at its 
weakest. 
 
5.4. NSDS II: NEW LEASE ON LIFE 
5.4.1. Key Events During NSDS II 
Merseta Board appointed: The Board was appointed to, once again, implement the 
new NSDS. Likewise, the minister appointed stakeholder representatives as 
nominated by their constituencies. This time, however, the Board inexplicably grew 
to 45 including the CEO. Figure 5.9 indicates the increase in representation.  
Figure 5.9: Board stakeholder representation DURING NSDS II 
 
Legends: Business = blue and Labour = red 
 
This increase appeared to be Minister Mdladlana’s way of ensuring the Board reflects the size of the 
stakeholders in the sector.  
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Raymond Patel Becomes Merseta CEO: Joint CEO’s Wayne Adams and Corli van 
Rensburg handed over the reins to Dr Raymond Patel at the beginning of the NSDS II 
(ibid). This appointment coincided with the revival of Numsa’s National Training 
Committee which culminated with Cosatu’s conference on skills development three 
years later. Figure 5.2 shows that a number of positive things started happening for the 
SETA following Merseta’s revival of its training committee.  
 
Figure 5.10: Key events during NSDS II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nedlac’s constituency engagements may also have acted as a catalyst for collective 
action to take root but change takes time. Unlike in the NSDS I period Numsa started 
becoming more engaged with the SETA. But business was still hesitant.  
Numsa revives National Training Committee: Following the success and 
expansion of the Accelerated Artisan Training Programme (AATP) pilot project, 
Numsa began to get more involved with skills development. Numsa’s appetite for 
monitoring the implementation of the productions of artisans coincided with 
Merseta’s expansion of the AATP.  
Numsa campaign for AATP: As South Africa slipped further down the World 
Economic Forum competitiveness rankings to 54 with skills and education cited as 
major weaknesses, Cedric Gina Numsa president accused firms’ ‘strange reasons’ 
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for pulling back from playing a meaningful role in ensuring that the country produced 
scarce skills: ‘I cannot comprehend why companies, Seifsa in this case, did not 
ensure that we increase the numbers of apprenticeship contracts to prepare for 
competition from other markets.’ Seifsa had earlier noted that apprentice intake in 
the metal chamber had increased from less than 2 000 apprentices in 2003 to 5 730 
in 2009, but that this was far short of the 1982 intake of over 12 000 riled Numsa. 
Hlangani, (2007) joined his president in putting pressure to business to respond to 
what Numsa perceived, at best, as bottlenecks and, at worse, sleaze and deception 
that continued to stymie the supply of urgently-needed artisan skills training. 
BLSA urges business to retake Merseta: Numsa’s motivation to ensure labour 
benefits from workplace training inspired Business Leaderships South Africa to 
agitate for employers to retake Merseta. This newfound energy from both labour and 
firms seemed to have galvanised the adoption of AATP. Table 5.3 shows the 
success of the programme in reducing the time it takes to complete an 
apprenticeship from this period, that is, 2007 and 2008.  
Table 5.3: Completion of apprenticeships by months 
 
Source: Merseta Annual Report 2008/09 
Employer apathy towards SETAs is a weakness in the NSDS-driven system as it 
leads to a disjunction between the SETA strategy and firm’s activities. Nonetheless, 
it is encouraging to note Business Leadership South Africa urging business 
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associations to take participation in Merseta very seriously. Business is a key NSDS 
player expected to work in partnership with other stakeholders. 
DHET is formed: The Department of Education was split into two to form the 
Departments of Basic Education and Higher Education and Training. The latter’s 
focus was to be post-school education including all forms of skills development. This 
meant the Department of Labour was also expected to relinquish skills development 
and labour market intelligence to the new department. For Merseta it meant less 
confusion as they are now going to be reporting to one minister instead of two – 
labour and education.  
Board Chairperson resigns: Following an investigation by the Auditor General into 
contracts, a controversial R180 million project (one of nine contracts awarded 
improperly) to train 5 000 petrol station attendants over four years was cancelled 
because it never went out to tender. Merseta’s chairperson Lizel Heunis was 
implicated in the scandal and forced to resign. This action against a powerful 
member of the Board was a signal that the key actors were beginning to take their 
fiduciary duties seriously. In 2006, the report of the auditor general (AG) placed 
specific material emphasis requiring attention, namely: the Merseta does not have a 
legislative mandate to source documentation to support revenue; non-compliance 
with supply chain policy; and unclear strategic objectives,17 and nothing seemed to 
have been done.  
Firms shun skills development: The 2008 global financial meltdown led the South 
African economy to a recession that tested the Merseta multi-stakeholder initiatives 
to the core. Key stakeholders agree that retrenched workers must be retrained.  
‘Following a board decision, we also availed R80 million for the Retrenchment 
Assistance Plan which assists companies and business facing downscaling in 
these harsh times. Merseta makes money available for further training rather 
than retrenchment so that when the economy is revitalised, workers can 
return to full productivity.’ (Patel quoted in Merseta, 2009). 
The spike in registrations in 2009 and 2010 may be as a result of this call but again 
far fewer learners completed their retraining, as employers saw the initiative as a 
                                                          
17
 Merseta Annual Report 2006/07 p 37. Johannesburg: Merseta  
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union project. In a year after the launch of the initiative, there were only 23 
companies actively participating in the project, a fraction of the about 50 000 firms in 
the sector.   
 
The small number exposed firms’ general disregard for workplace training and, 
therefore, their often negligible participation in skills development activities. This 
underinvestment in skills development was true with firms in the Merseta sector 
during the NSDS II. Despite the rhetoric to transform firms into training sites, some 
companies still placed profits before collective objectives such as responding to the 
challenge of scarce and critical skills.  
 
The process tracing observation showed the pervasive nature of corruption and 
shirking as some top managers appeared to have been in collusion with Board 
members. Nonetheless, islands of effectiveness were beginning to emerge mainly as 
a result of Numsa beginning to be more engaged in the affairs of the SETA. This 
give credence to the proposition that the stronger the incentives and commitment to 
multi-stakeholder objectives, the greater the incentives to prevent predation, shirking 
and other negative practices.  
 
But more heartening is that, as argued by Levy (2014), CEOs of state-owned entities 
such as the arrival of Patel can be a catalyst for things to start moving in line with the 
collective mandate. Numsa started to vigorously campaign for the support of 
Merseta’s initiatives. This indicated that if the social partners have a collective 
initiative to support skills development, they would have strong incentives to ensure 
SETAs work adequately, and by so doing work towards preventing free riding, 
shirking and other selfish activities.   
 
Having learned from its 2004 pilot project with the businesses in the metal chamber, 
Numsa embarked on the innovative approach to artisan training. The AATP worked 
because all the stakeholders had high motivation to see it becoming a success.  
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Undoubtedly, this demonstrated the success of the collective action for joint benefits. 
But the implementation of the AATP was not without its share of resistance. 
Responding to what it felt were deliberate actions to undermine artisan training, 
Numsa urged employers to start supporting the scarce and critical skills rather than 
short courses (Hlangani, 2007). 
 
During this time the SETA also managed to stand against its chairperson. Merseta’s 
supply chain manager raised concerns that prompted the investigation that 
implicated its chairperson. The concerns were taken up by, among others, Numsa. In 
this case the protagonists Numsa effectively used its countervailing power to ensure 
the Auditor General investigated the allegations, and threats from both a powerful 
chairperson of the Board and external parties were successfully trumped. 
 
5.5. NSDS III: BUGS AND ISLANDS OF EFFECTIVENESS  
 
Bugs and Issues: In line with the NSDS III objectives DHET published new SETA 
grant regulations. Business representatives in the Merseta Board were furious with 
the new deal and threatened to take DHET to court (Freeman, 2011). But the threats 
came to nought. Figure 5.11 documented the key events during NSDS III which was 
still being implemented.  
 
 
  Figure 5.11: Key events during NSDS III  
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Chair appointed for 5 years: For the first time Merseta changed its constitution to 
enable it to elect a chairperson to serve for five. Before this the chairperson faced an 
election every annual general meeting composed of the represented stakeholders. 
This short tenure was risky and may have unnecessarily exposed chairpersons to 
‘pork barrelling’ making them vulnerable to please rather than lead. This change 
coincided with the Minister of Higher Education and Training appointing Board 
members for the first time.  
 
Minister Nzimande reduced the Board to 15 included three independent members. 
For the first time more members were sourced from business (7) than labour (5). The 
remainder came from independent members, two academics and one business 
women. Numsa took four of the five spaces for labour. This move seemed to work to 
stabilise the SETA and refocus it to its mandate. The following process tracing 
observations are instructive on the incentives, goals, and constraints of the key 
players in Merseta: 
 
1. The WSPs submitted annually by firms provided useful information about skills 
and employment trends in the sub-sectors. The WSPs submitted in June 2011 
represented only 29.4% of the levy-paying organisations in the sector still making 
it difficult to predict, plan and implement a demand-driven skills development 
strategy. That so few firms submitted WSPs showed that the problem of 
employer empathy towards skills development is resilient18. This is a weakness in 
the NSDS-driven system as it leads to a disjunction between the SETAs 
strategies and the firm’s activities. 
2. Merseta had experienced a consistent participation by the employers in their 
submission of WSPs in the financial year 2012/13 – a little step but in the right 
direction19.  
3. After a slow start Merseta’s contribution to the training and certification of 
artisans began to pick up (Patel, 2014).  
4. Senior Managers charged with corruption. 
                                                          
18
 Merseta Annual Report 2011/12 
19
 Merseta Annual Report 2012/13 
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Former employee jailed: As a result of Merseta’s collective action beginning to 
assert itself, the SETA also saw existing and former top managers being charged 
with fraud and corruption conducted while they were still in the SETAs payroll. 
Following the successful trial and conviction of its erstwhile manager, Merseta’s CEO 
jubilantly cautioned: ‘We do not bask in the misfortune of others, but, in this case, 
justice has been done. Kwenda used an elaborate scheme to defraud 26 companies 
of their due grants. Thousands of people could have been trained using that money. 
I trust this sends a message to all that the Merseta will not tolerate corruption in any 
form’.20 
 
Merseta dismisses whistleblower: Even though there are clear signs that the 
SETA was beginning to be vocal against predation, it was also disheartening that it 
suspended its senior supply-chain manager Takalani Murathi, three days after 
reporting possible tender irregularities amounting to about R45-million to the Special 
Investigative Unit and the Public Protector.21 Claiming Murathi was suspended for 
alleged fraud, Merseta took the City Press to the Press Council for its 14 September 
2014 article headlined Man lifts lid on Merseta – Staff member turns to labour court 
for protection after blowing the whistle on corruption in Seta claiming the newspaper 
did not adequately cover its comment.22 Merseta subsequently dismissed Murathi for 
fraudulently obtaining an auctioned vehicle which had reached its sell-by date from 
the organisation.23 
 
As indicated in the above sections, the majority of Merseta firms do not see any 
value in submitting ATRs and WSPs. Likewise, this was began to change, perhaps, 
signalling that stakeholders’ incentives to work for the public ends is on the up. The 
general observations in this period is that stakeholders and individuals are beginning 
to work together and, in turn, islands of effectiveness against corruption and in 
workplace training are beginning to emerge. Hypothesis 1 passes the hoop tests. 
                                                          
20
 http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/former-merseta-bank-employees-jailed-for-defrauding-
authority-of-r62m-2014-10-20 
21
 http://www.r2k.org.za/2014/12/12/r2k-whistleblowers-2015-takalani-murathi/ 
22
 http://www.presscouncil.org.za/Ruling/View/meraseta-vs-city-press-2687 
23
 http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/merseta-dismisses-fraudulent-senior-manager-2015-07-03 
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The observations increase plausibility of the proposition. Nonetheless, Hypothesis 2 
is refuted. SETAs are not failing to respond to the collective incentives of the social 
partners. But for SETAs to respond adequately they need committed stakeholders 
sitting in their Boards. These events prove that strengthening multi-stakeholder 
partnership would harness the interests of the key stakeholders towards the 
attainment of collective objectives.  In line with Hypothesis 3 SETA Boards would not 
fail to act on behalf of the interests of the social partners if the agent-principal 
linkages are strong. Minister Nzimande, Numsa, and a number of business 
associations started taking their interests in the Merseta seriously leading to the 
emergence of islands of effectiveness that the SETA can build on going forward.  
 
Responding to the weaknesses of the labour-employer-SETA tripartite relationship, 
the NSDS III provided for a more active role for the SETAs. By increasing the 
incentives for firms to train more, the PIVOTAL grant sought to allow learners not 
only to graduate but also to get invaluable work and industry experience that will 
make them more employable. But it seems like government may have misdiagnosed 
firms’ lack of enthusiasm about the NSDS-driven workplace training. The response 
of the firms towards SETAs is improving but at a slow and organic pace.  
 
New SETA landscape: A new SETA landscape was proposed at the end of 2015. 
Following the Green and White Papers on Post-school Education and Training, the 
Minister gazetted a proposal to overhaul SETAs in December. The proposal sought 
to turn SETAs into SETABs, that is, Advisory Boards (Republic of South Africa, 
2015). This move would centralise power to the Department of Higher Education and 
Training and run the risk of alienating key stakeholders. It is too early to pinpoint how 
this proposal would affect Merseta.   
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
 
Merseta’s first 10 years will be remembered for the hasty resignations of the first 
three CEOs and at least one chairperson, all resigning under a cloud of alleged 
corruption and mismanagement of funds. Effectively Merseta had at least six CEOs 
in six years with the appointment of Dr Patel. This changing and chopping at the top 
did not augur well for service delivery. This high turnover was as a result of the 
infighting that engrossed the key social partners of the SETA. Top managers were 
left to do as they pleased. The uncertainty, confusion and lack of leadership saw 
individuals and groups in positions of power both within the Board and top 
management colluding to unjustly benefit from the SETA. It is plausible to believe 
that such corruption, maladministration and mismanagement of public funds is bad 
for the industry’s efforts to address the critical shortage of artisans. Through process 
tracing the study has revealed that when social partners’ incentives for collective 
benefits is low predation, as outlined by Levy (2014) reigns supreme.  
 
On the other side of the coin, when strong collective action is high, social partners 
are highly motivated to engage in collective initiatives to support actions that would 
lead to public good. This had been observed during NSDS III where islands of 
effectiveness began to emerge such as a strong desire to work against predation. 
For the first time the SETA was willing to stand up against its own including its 
chairperson, a representative of a powerful business association, after years of 
turning a deaf ear to such allegations. The same strong collective action was also 
beginning to show that if the social partners have a collective initiative to support 
skills development, they would have strong incentives to prevent free riding, shirking 
and predation.  
 
Even though, the initial threats from representatives of business in Merseta to litigate 
against the Minister at the beginning of NSDS III could not be interpreted as 
contributing to a heightened collective interest by the partners, it was a fleeting 
moment eclipsed by the Minister’s appointment to the Merseta Board of more 
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representatives of business than labour. This, together with the three independent 
members, changing of the constitution to allow the appointment of the Chairperson 
for five years (instead of one), and the renewal of the CEO’s contract brought 
stability to Merseta. 
 
There is more evidence supporting the main hypothesis of the study. First, during 
NSDS I, where the collective initiative for some stakeholders to support skills 
development was low, predation, as explained by Levy (2014) was at its highest. 
Allegations of corruption started dwindling in NSDS II and further in NSDS III as the 
SETA Board started to work together thus agreeing with the theory that if the social 
partners comprising the SETA Boards have a collective initiative to support skills 
development, they will have strong incentives to adequately govern SETAs and not 
free ride or shirk their fiduciary duties thus ensuring alignment of SETA strategy with 
the NSDS, and in so doing prevent individual and groups from capturing the public 
initiative for private purposes. During NSDS II and III there are strong signals of 
Merseta beginning to act against its own where there are allegations of 
mismanagement of funds and corruption. Observations made during process tracing 
agreed with Hypothesis 1. The alignment of SETA strategy with the NSDS depended 
on the extent of commitment of the social partners to govern in their collective 
interest. From NSDS I when stakeholder commitment was low to NSDS III when it 
picked up indicated that strong incentives of the key social partners to adequately 
govern do foil free loading and shirking thus preventing individual and groups from 
capturing the public initiative for private purposes. 
  
Undoubtedly, the success of the last 10 years is the innovative implementation of the 
AATP. But it was also not without its share of resistance. But it proved that it is 
possible to turn around the skills shortage if labour and business collaborate. 
Drawing on the analytical framework developed in Chapter 4, it seemed like the 
establishment of the AATP is a manifestation of the potential of the collaborative 
governance to counterbalance predation. Unlike the pitched battles of the NSDS I, 
the second phase was more robust than just filibustering. Numsa, for example, 
managed to promote the AATP and get buy in from sceptical business associations. 
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The collaborative governance arrangements of labour and business showed signs of 
participants recognising their respective power to deal with internal and external 
threats. Business holds the key to open factory shops for training, which is crucial for 
the success of the NSDS. This disproves Hypothesis 2. Merseta, with time, managed 
to harness the collective incentives of the social partners. 
 
Again, in line with Hypothesis 3 there was enough evidence of individuals acting to 
pursue their own private ends rather than those of the collective. There is also 
evidence that predation is bad for SETA performance. Labour and business had 
shown that without collective action, workplace training will fail. Both groups began to 
support the new CEO Patel and the AATP with positive results. Even so, drawing 
from Ostrom’s ‘good practice’ guiding principles, monitoring and evaluation by 
government improved immensely in NSDS III but still needed to be strengthened. 
Any policy development must therefore be placed squarely within the context of 
strengthening the Boards in such a way that the adversarial power of both labour 
and business is managed. Like in NSDS III smaller Boards with independent people 
seemed to curb the infighting in the Boards. 
 
The process tracing analysis showed that Merseta is in a positive trajectory. Policy 
development must recognise that building an institution is an intricate and 
challenging course of action that required determined and sustained investment. And 
so, changes must be incremental and build on what works like the social partnership 
in the implementation of the AATP. However, this would not be a success if 
governance issues remain weak. Policy must also move towards incentivising the 
companies not only for submitting WSPs and ATRs but also for training more 
artisans and placing more learners in their workplaces. This can be linked to the 
payment of the levy by firms or to grants paid to companies by the SETAs. In 
practice a company that trains more in relation to other companies in the sector 
would get back a larger percentage of the grants. A tiered system can be employed 
to incentivise more companies that focuses on the scarce and critical skills that takes 
longer to complete. For instance, the scarcer the skills, the bigger the grants the 
firms would be entitled to.  
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Dostie (2015) also observed that the training levy scheme encouraged medium sized 
firms to engage in general, costly, complex, time-consuming, and certified training as 
long as the incentives for such training are increased. Following this logic, employers 
must not be restricted on the amount they can claim as long as they can prove they 
are contributing to national targets. Employers can claim extra grants for training 
more in the type of skills the economy demands as an incentive to counter the 
externality of general training such as poaching. This policy step will motivate 
companies to train more than their competitors, and not only get a lion’s share of the 
grant but also be first in line to get better skilled workers. This step may also 
encourage SMME’s to train to keep pace with their counterparts. Leuven and 
Osterbeek (2004) found that increasing the incentives for smaller firms to train 
increased their investment in workplace training significantly.  
 
A strong monitoring and evaluation must also be put in place to avoid administrative 
difficulties and other unintended consequences as well as companies’ trying to 
‘game’ the system. But the NSDS must also recognise that firms, in line with 
Becker’s (1962) theory, know the type of skills they need. Becker (1962) noted that 
the reason that firms don’t already provide the training was because of the ‘worker 
poaching’ problem. There was a collective incentive within the sector for this general 
training to be provided, but individual firms are concerned that, if they train more than 
other firms, then their workers would be poached. The levy-grant system was a step 
in the right direction as it induced all firms to contribute to workplace training. Future 
policy steps should focus on tweaking the grants until a desirable equilibrium was 
reached. For instance, if firms know best the type of skills they required, then 
increasing the mandatory grant to training firms would encourage them to invest 
even in the longer, more expensive technical training the firms and country desire.  
 
The theories supporting workplace training identifies beneficiaries as workers 
already employed. Plausibly, the logic also works for providing training for potential 
new entrants into the industry. This leaves out the unemployed youth. Perhaps, the 
workplace and levy-grant system was not the perfect solution to deal with 
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joblessness, as the number of new entrants joining the labour market each year was 
far in excess of the likely demand of existing employers and available trainers and 
mentors. Following Becker’s train of thoughts, training for employability was negative 
to a firm’s objectives. For firms training tends to be demand-driven. Using workplace 
training to solve unemployment and poverty was based on a hope of benevolent 
firms who would help with the broader training challenges of South Africa’s labour 
force. So in some fundamental sense, it may have been that the very large 
disconnect between the NSDS and workplace training made SETA implementation 
very tricky. As suggested by Marock (2010) there was a need to narrow the scope of 
SETAs to focus on workplace training to diversify skills formation towards the scarcer 
vocational, technical, artisanal skills, and other critical skills. Pre-employment training 
and new entrants can focus solely on apprentices and internships that increase the 
supply of well-trained work seekers to meet the demand in the labour market.  
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